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FOREWORD
Nigeria is one of the pivotal states of Africa and is
extremely important to U.S. diplomatic and economic
interests on that continent. However, Americans’ general lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of Nigeria undercuts our interactions with this crucial state
to the detriment of both sides. Indeed, it is difficult
to understand Nigeria, since it is a swirling paradox
of riches and poverty, growth and stagnation, international influence and domestic paralysis, cultural
diversity, and ethnic and religious clashes.
For that reason, I am pleased to present this monograph, which seeks to reveal Nigeria to outsiders. It
explores a key way to understand Nigeria through its
political economy, which gives more nuanced insight
into its entrenched problems, and thus offers better
approaches by which the U.S. Government, and especially its military, can play a constructive role in maintaining the stability and integrity of Nigeria.
For those readers unfamiliar with the foundational
term of “political economy,” this monograph explains
this key concept and then astutely analyzes how the
cultural, religious, economic, and political forces
that tear at the unity of Nigeria are best understood
through it. Such an approach addresses well Nigeria’s
debilitating, rampant corruption and the challenge of
deep internal fissures.
With this improved understanding of the
Nigerian people and its government, necessarily modest recommendations for U.S. military involvement
are then suggested to better assist Nigerians in attaining the stability they and the international community
require of a functioning, integrated state. Although
a complex and daunting topic, this monograph
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follows in a long tradition of Strategic Studies
Institute publications that address difficult topics directly and contribute realistic recommendations in
response to important questions.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Understanding the political economy of Nigeria is
needed to reveal the root causes of its many ethnic, religious, economic, and political problems and address
them for the long term. The pressures now weighing
on Nigeria could literally fracture the state along deep
fault lines if rampant corruption and partisanship
continues. The United States, in a mutually important
partnership with Nigeria, should assist in specific but
indirect ways to help Nigerians overcome their political economy problems, which could serve both the interests of the United States and Nigeria. Within such
assistance, the role of the U.S. military is particularly
delicate, but needed through focused aid to specific
programs and sharing of expertise, all best managed
through employing units that are regionally aligned
to Nigeria or West Africa.
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THE CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN NIGERIA
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES
Nigeria represents the best and worst of what African states offer the world. It is a mosaic of over 250
different ethnic groups and languages enriched as a
crossroads between various forms of Christianity, Islam, and indigenous beliefs, and Western, Arab, and
native influences. Its large area holds productive agricultural land and immense deposits of oil and natural gas rated at 10th and 8th largest, respectively, in
world reserves.1 Nigeria possesses international political clout through its strong military forces and active
role in peace operations, as well as its recognized diplomatic leadership in international organizations like:
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC);
as a founding member in the African Union (AU);
and, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECWAS).2 Its population of 174 million also makes
it by far the largest state in Africa and the 7th most
populous in the world.3 Nigeria is a land blessed.
Nigeria also demonstrates many of the problems
that plague much of Africa’s stability and progress.
Nigerians have routinely endured strife along their
many internal differences, from the bloody 1967-70
civil war to the one million Nigerians displaced by
internal turmoil between 1999 and 2004.4 Its larder of
natural resources brings in much needed foreign revenue, but is a vast source of corruption, internecine
conflict, and degradation to the environment and agricultural livelihoods. Its history since independence in
1960 has been tossed by political tumult with numerous military coups and autocratic governments, four
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different republics, and a poor human rights record.
Such problems have hobbled economic, social, and
human development in Nigeria, which suffers a low
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (purchasing
power parity) of $2,500 (175th in the world), literacy
rate of only 61 percent, life expectancy of 47.6 years
(220th in the world), and poverty rate at 70 percent,
all making Nigeria one of the 20 poorest countries per
capita in the world.5 The country is noted as a hub for
cyber crimes, drug and human trafficking, piracy, and
nascent native extremism, as well as disease and general human suffering.6 Nigeria is a troubled land.
This paradox of a nation offers much to its citizens
and the world, but Nigeria has been unable to deliver
on its potential or realize its aspirations.7 Although
currently in a positive trend of strong economic
growth and improving democratic resiliency, the fundamental problems that have challenged Nigerian
progress throughout its history remain simmering.
These problems have been ascribed to many complex
causes, including its colonial legacy, international intrigue, poverty, and cultural and religious conflicts,
that leave Nigeria sometimes tottering at the edge of
instability and liable to fracturing. However, the root
cause for these and other problems may be the result
of the political economy of Nigeria and the resulting
centrifugal and centripetal forces that hold Nigeria as
a unified state in the balance. To test this assertion,
this monograph will first explain the definition of political economy employed here; why Nigeria wavers
sometimes on the edge of failing as a state through
the negative interaction of competing economics,
politics, and societies; and the resulting rampant corruption and ossified fault lines that could splinter the
state. It then makes modest recommendations for the
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U.S. Government, and the U.S. military in particular,
to assist Nigerians in attaining the stability needed to
remain a functioning, integrated state. With its large
population, ethnic tapestry, rich economic potential,
diplomatic clout, and military strength, Nigeria remains an important regional power in Africa with
increasing influence in international affairs. According to both the Departments of Defense (DoD) and
State (DoS) in their 2010 engagement activities report
to Congress:
U.S. engagement with Nigeria on political, economic,
and security issues is vital to the stability and prosperity of West Africa and the entire continent.8

Nigeria is thus worthy of serious U.S. efforts at understanding and assistance.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A STATE
IN TURMOIL
In the daily routines of citizens and states alike,
politics, economics, and culture are strong interrelated
influencers. These are each encompassed in the useful
term “political economy,” which is concerned with
the “interconnection of economic and political structures in social formation.”9 The central use of political
economy in this study considers the mutual influence
of economic activities and policies on politics and its
ideologies, cultural and historic factors, and the selfinterests of affected groups.10 These broad interlocking concepts include several elements of the political
economy that support this analysis, including formation of self-interested group action, redistribution of
public economic gain, effects of cultural background,
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and reform and development in the political, economic, and social aspects of Nigeria. The economy in terms
of its benefits and rewards, as they are influenced by
political and social activities and organizations, is the
focus of this monograph.
Despite its daunting intricacies, the political
economy is a rather self-evident concept. By our nature, human beings want to influence those things
of most significance to us. Economic well-being
ranks high in importance in meeting human needs,
so it is not surprising that political and cultural associations would be formed to influence economic
outcomes to benefit an individual or group. Indeed,
classic economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo primarily addressed political economy issues
in their works. It was not until the 1880s that politics and economics were divorced in the continuing
effort to quantify economics free of the taint of outside influences to create “an independent sphere of
economics where politics didn’t intrude and that
mathematics allowed markets to be predictable. . . .”11
The linkage of these forces in human endeavors is
undeniable, however, which explains why a serious
examination of turmoil afflicting a state like Nigeria
must rely on this inexact but encompassing concept.
Therefore, political and social involvement in economic affairs should be expected, and economic results will in turn affect them.12 The political economy
may be the most important, although certainly not the
only, factor in explaining a state’s current and future
prosperity and stability.13
Because they are so fundamental to the well-being
of humans, the distribution of power and economic
gains may be the most volatile of intrastate problems.
Under conditions of robust equitable per capita eco-
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nomic growth, intrastate political and social rivalries
are rare or can be ignored so as to not upset the shared
benefits of growth. This situation occurred during the
boom days of Yugoslavia, when one of Europe’s fastest growing economies in the 1950s and 1960s overshadowed the interethnic and political turmoil that
killed 750,000 Yugoslavs (through internecine fighting
alone) during World War II. When relative standards
of living decline or are inequitable, however, conditions often deteriorate, and problems manifest themselves as political or cultural cleavages in zero-sum
pursuit of diminishing economic gains. Such was the
case of the Yugoslav economic decline of the 1980s following international oil shocks and poor government
policies that ultimately led to the political, cultural,
and regional clashes that fractured Yugoslavia during
the 1990s.14 The examples of Yugoslavia and states like
Sudan are instructive to the situation in Nigeria today.
Through most of its history, Nigeria’s economy has
woefully underperformed, with the resulting expected competition along a variety of traditional and modern self-interest groups. From independence in 1960 to
2000, Nigeria’s income per capita stagnated in terms of
purchasing power parity (PPP) despite the income per
capita from petroleum, Nigeria’s dominating source
of income, increasing tenfold.15 The country’s per
capita GDP (at the official exchange rate)16 dropped
from a high of $1,500 during the 1970s to a low of $300
in 1998, doubling the poverty rate to 70 percent.17 By
2010, the GDP nearly recovered to $1,470, but poverty
still remained at 70 percent, signaling serious inequity
problems.18 Analysis of 2010 communal clashes by a
Nigerian professor in the chronically violence-prone
central city of Jos noted a combination of political
economic factors, including social apathy, economic
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deprivation, and political frustration: “[I]t’s simply an
exhibition of the failure of governance in Nigeria; it’s
an exhibition of a very serious economic problem that
Nigerians find themselves in.” He goes on to observe
that “too often in the midst of serious economic crisis,
people often lose sight of the real problem to exploit
the most visible difference between groups, in the case
of Jos, the religious difference.”19 As this one example
and the rest of this monograph will show, Nigeria’s
frequent and bloody turmoil throughout its history
is often a result of manipulated groups clashing for a
bigger share of an inadequately sized pie.
This poor record of economic development in Nigeria, despite its potential, is in large part due to two
political economic causes which help to explain why
economic policies have not fared better. The first is the
inability of its leaders to meld a unified nation out of
the “fragmented geographic and ethnic components”
in Nigeria. The second is the unstable government
structure from colonial to alternating elected and authoritarian regimes, with numerous military coups
and different forms of governments.20 Nigerians did
not possess a strong sense of unity before or during
the colonial period, which discouraged a sense of nationhood; indeed, British authorities may have actively pursued playing groups against each other.21 Economic development was also not seriously stressed
in colonial times beyond infrastructure development
needed to exploit native resources and markets for
imperial interests.22 Since independence, demagogic
politicians have sought to gain regional, ethnic, and
confessional group support for their own interests
and have severely divided Nigeria’s society and polity. Self-determination, a method used by minorities to
mobilize against central authority and leverage their
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position for concessions, is a common tactic in Nigerian politics and was taken to its limit in the unsuccessful secession of Biafra during the 1967-70 civil war.23
Nigeria’s wealth continues to be seen as a source of
exploitation by its elite, often pitting groups against
each other in pursuit of controlling national wealth.24
In these ways, historic and modern economic, political, and social forces have influenced each other, resulting in a chronically weakened state.
The Political Economy in a Nigerian Rentier State.
Many of Nigeria’s problems can be traced to its
political economy because it represents the breadand-butter issues that may sow internal disharmony.
The country’s policies have unbalanced the economy
into one that depends highly upon exporting energy
resources, which become the lucrative target of political economic infighting. The effects of a single product economy have encouraged self-serving actions by
Nigerian citizens and organizations; fostered dependence on easy economic gains; and made the government overly centralized, unresponsive to its citizens,
and corrupt. This section addresses Nigeria’s economy and explains how it has become the foundation for
so many other problems and a chronic distraction in
U.S.-Nigerian relations.25
Nigeria’s huge population, many resources, and
favorable location produced a large economy that has
integrated into the greater global economy through
the centuries. Nigeria ranked 31st in the world in
national GDP PPP, with $419 billion in 2011, and a
healthy growth rate averaging above 7 percent since
2003.26 The high price of petroleum over that period
accounts for much of the wealth, since oil produces
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25 percent of Nigeria’s GDP and 80 percent of its government budget revenues.27 Petroleum has taken over
modern Nigeria’s economy, rocketing from just 1 percent of GDP in 1960 to 26 percent in 1970. By 1976, oil
dominated Nigeria's exports at 94 percent, remaining
at 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings in 2011.28
By comparison, Nigeria’s economic output during the
1960s was 61 percent agricultural and was the cultural
base of many ethnic groups.29 The manufacturing sector, employing traditional skills and native products,
was growing to a high of 11 percent of GDP in the 1970s
before falling to just half that amount in 2000 and continuing to decline since.30 In 2011, the agricultural sector employed 70 percent of Nigeria’s labor force and
was 35 percent of its GDP, but it accounted for only
4 percent of exports, while manufacturing accounted
for only 1 percent of its GDP.31 Foreign enclave energy
production has entirely changed the basis of Nigeria’s
economy and collection of government revenues, and
it has “undemocratized” its economy and tax base in
the process.
The consequences of the oil boom in Nigeria and
subsequent economic fallout is a classic example of
“Dutch disease,” in which an economic boon, often
coming from a natural resource, has the unwanted
effect of expanding a country’s prices and thereby
depressing local production and nonresource exports
through indirectly subsidizing cheaper imports—all
of which hampers growth.32 Although a country as
large and diverse as Nigeria has considerable influence over its economy through government policies,33
Nigeria has consistently mismanaged its bonanza.
A common consequence of Dutch disease makes the
economy depend more upon a single commodity or
sector and thus is prone to buffeting by international
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markets during unpredictable boom and bust cycles.
In Nigeria, this is exacerbated by implementing expedient short-term solutions over long-term development.34 Also, high economic growth spurred by oil
production has been unable to pace Nigeria’s staggering population growth, which nearly quadrupled
from 46 million in 1960 to 174 million in 2013, with an
average of 5.4 children born to each woman of childbearing age today.35 Nigeria’s chronic case of Dutch
disease was contracted through a combination of misguided and self-centered actions by the government,
individuals, and mutually suspicious interest groups
that have been unable to overcome partisanship.
Nigeria’s cycle of disruptive and violent intergroup
competition was paved in part with good intentions
and unintended consequences. Starting in the late1960s, the Nigerian government curtailed the amount
of impartial technical advice it received by disbanding its core of international economic advisers.36 One
outcome of this action was that it tried “to do too
much too soon, leaving the government administratively overextended.”37 Parts of the massive Nigerian
government borrowing that followed went to finance
“lavish, often superfluous” factory construction and
poorly conceived prestige projects of dubious need
that suffocated private enterprise.38 Nigerian producers were also undermined by a currency inflated with
oil earnings, which greatly increased the importing
of consumables at the expense of locally produced
goods.39 Natural resource extraction absorbed nearly
all foreign, private, and public investment, creating
chronic rural underinvestment in the agricultural
sector and its related infrastructure.40 Another unexpected effect was that energy production jobs diverted
skilled and unskilled labor from manufacturing and

9

agricultural pursuits.41 These negative effects of misallocating resources are classic symptoms of Dutch
disease. Another secondary consequence was the serious environmental damage from extractive industries
(including coal and tin) that directly damaged agricultural and aquatic pursuits and the livelihoods of Nigeria’s poorest people, creating the unwanted effect of
inciting crime and insurgency among the disaffected.42
Beyond the misallocation of funds, other government policies inadvertently hurt Nigeria’s economic
development.43 During the boom years, Nigerian officials allowed the official currency exchange rate to
appreciate and then kept it artificially overvalued
when oil prices fell.44 The dire results of this monetary
policy were to depress native production of goods,
fuel inflation, and encourage black market activities.45
This policy crowded out other economic activities
like agriculture and manufacturing, which could not
play a sufficient role to counterbalance the effect of
cyclical declines in oil revenue on the world economy.
To smooth the troughs of international oil price fluctuations and to leverage export income during good
times, Nigeria borrowed heavily from foreign sources,
causing deep indebtedness and increased exposure to
the dictates of crediting countries and organizations
when those debts could not be paid.46 The large expansion of government employment also diverted
talent from other economic endeavors and increased
wage rates added to inflationary pressure.47 Through
lack of vision or corrupt intent, Nigeria’s leaders have
failed to diversify its economy or maintain its infrastructure, to the serious detriment of the economy.48
Despite the disbanding of the international advisors
group, Nigerian officials may have understood the
nature of these criticized economic policies. However,
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they were constrained by political pressure from their
highly fractured constituents, who were maximizing
their share in an underperforming economy.49 For
many reasons, the economic sectors in which the large
majority of Nigerians work receive much less support
from public investment and policy than that given to
the highly concentrated extractive sector; yet proceeds
from these natural resource based industries do not
increase the general welfare of the population nor
compensate them for their losses.50 In Nigeria, these
represent political decisions with far ranging economic and social consequences.
In addition to poor decisions and constrained
options, other, baser, reasons also explain Nigeria’s
underperforming economy. Since the rents from
the resource sector usually go to the government,
Thomas Friedman’s “curse of oil” posits how Nigerian autocrats misuse the state’s wealth because they
hold control over its rich natural resources—freeing
them from accountability to their citizens; this was
probably an underlying motive of the civil war.51 The
quality of a state’s institutions, whether prone to being “grabber-friendly or producer-friendly . . . is the
key to understanding the resource curse: when institutions are bad, resource abundance is a curse. . . .”52
Throughout history, Nigerian administrations and
their regional, cultural, religious, political, and economic associations consistently have been grabberfriendly. Dutch disease also increases the occurrence
of corruption.53 In one example, the regime of General Yakubu Gowan, which presided over the oil
boom of the 1960s and 1970s, saw the oil windfall as
a source of patronage through economic policies like
import-substitution that could reward political allies
“through gross misuse of the oil. . . .”54 From 1988 to
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1993, an official government report found $13 billion,
or 20 percent of total revenues, were “sidetracked to
off-budget accounts” that were entirely unmonitored
and undermined economic growth. Within 2 years of
that 1994 report, the regime of General Sani Abacha
diverted 17 percent of Nigeria’s GDP into off-budget
accounts, thereby making two-thirds of government
revenue unaccountable.55 Over decades, a quarter of
Nigeria’s oil revenue, $50-$100 billion, “disappeared,”
enabling a corrupt class of politically oriented millionaires.56 These are sadly recurring events in Nigerian
history, and their origin and ramifications deserve
examination to better understand Nigeria’s broken
political economic circumstances.
The more academic term for the curse of natural
resources is a “rentier” state, in which an easily controlled valuable commodity brings income or “rents,”
rather than “a return on capital or entrepreneurship
. . . [I]t is wealth without work.”57 The dominance of
oil exports in Nigeria makes it a rentier state since
government revenues are derived mainly from export
of state controlled oil.58 The ability to receive state
revenues independent of taxation and the will of the
people is a potent force that may expand the jurisdiction of the controlling (usually central) government;
encourage politicization of minorities and regions
over redistribution of rents; eviscerate other economic
sectors as already shown; and increase reliance on
the “substitution of public spending for statecraft.”59
Wealth without work attracts entrepreneurially talented Nigerians and organizations away from enhancing the economy through improved agriculture,
industry, or services into self–interested public rent
seeking activities which misallocate skills and efforts
in the overall political economy.60 Rents are sought
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for direct wealth derived through corruption and embezzlement, but also for the power and influence they
yield when distributed through the political economy
to major interest groups in the private sector, ethnic
groups, and government.61 The allure of concentrated
oil wealth and power was probably also an underlying
motive of the 1967 civil war.62 The wealth from rents
may be dispersed through business contracts, foreign
exchange manipulation, appointments to public office,
trade controls, and bloated public sector employment
among other ways.63 These rentier state behaviors
account for Nigeria’s diverted wealth and sapped
potential.
Control of state resources is a sure means to wealth
and power in a rentier state, and the more avenues to
resources, the more the revenues can be tapped.64 In
1960, Nigeria comprised three large economically viable formal political regions that balanced the power of
the federal government. In response to a variety of ethnic, regional, and religious rivalries and to counter the
threat of secession, Nigeria sequentially fragmented
into 36 states by 1996 (with more proposed but never
implemented). This fracturing allowed some form of
self-determination and economic control for each majority in the ethnically favored new states.65 However,
it established fault lines that vastly increased the power of the central government, because most smaller
states grew to depend on federal handouts as their bureaucracies increased, and it shut out the many smaller minorities not represented as the majority in a state
of their own.66 The federal system in Nigeria has been
chronically manipulated, often promoting regional interests over national ones.67 States from which natural
resources originate, mainly in the oil producing Niger
Delta region, have gained more revenue through the
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rent allocation principle of “derivation,” which compensates the resource producing states with greater
cuts of the derived wealth, now standing at 18 percent
of rents compared to just 3 percent in the early-1990s,
although still not as much as the producing states desire.68 In 2004, a third, or $2 billion, of federal revenue
sharing went to four oil producing states, but little of
that was used to improve infrastructure and public
services.69 Control over these target states is a lucrative objective of their rent seeking elites, and makes
vulnerable the rest of the states, which depend upon
the central government’s revenue redistribution and
subsidies.70 A stronger centralized government makes
rent seeking more attractive and easier to dominate,
thus raising the stakes for all involved.
Another downside to the political economy is that
those elites in power, enjoying the benefits of rents,
tend to hinder general economic growth by concentrating on maintaining the status quo (referred to euphemistically as “sharing the national cake”) rather than
building development initiatives (making the cake).71
This maximizes the immediate resources available to
the elites in power, since their tenure is often uncertain
and panders to short-term distributive pressures from
constituents rather than long-term economic investments.72 Some constituents of elites in power benefit
from these arrangements in the short term, but such
patronage and poor governance weakens state institutions through less accountability, buying allegiance of
some groups through patronage and programs, and
alienating opposition groups out of power, since they
claim little influence through taxes or voting.73 The
Nigerian armed forces comprise another organization
that benefits from the rentier system, since their power (either in controlling the government or threatening
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to do so) ensures larger spending on the armed forces
at the expense of education, health care, and infrastructure.74 As distribution of government controlled
revenues increases, so does conflict among groups
and individuals over receiving those distributions.75 If
such ethnic, religious, regional, or organizational representation by its elite is viewed as a Nigerian form of
democracy, it is a peculiarly selective representative
form that seems to forfeit the general and future welfare of its people.
Nigerian society traditionally depends on clientpatron relationships, and many constituents expect
leaders to claim control of public resources to benefit their supporting interest groups through bribery,
nepotism, extortion, and favoritism.76 Subordinates
are often convinced that they gain when their identity
groups benefit from the actions of politicians and are
thus mobilized to their service.77 This allegiance is reinforced when politicians can deliver public goods to
their constituents through patronage when the state is
ineffectual at doing so.78 To shore up their positions,
Nigerian leaders may demonize rival identity groups
to exacerbate their constituents’ collective anxiety and
mobilize their self-centered support.79 This explains
the Nigerian elite’s relentless pursuit of government
office through harnessing the antagonisms of their
constituent groups to demand representation and access to rents in the form of redistributed public revenue.80 Unfortunately, the trust of Nigerians in these
groups is misplaced since greedy leaders usually
leave little to trickle down, as is evident in the destitute Niger Delta states.81 Elites also tend to be dismissive of their clients except when manipulated in
support of the elites’ interests.82 This toxic mixture
of motivations leaves the Nigerian polity with weak
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institutions, exploited subordinates, escalating violence that fractures Nigerian unity, and a poisoned
political economy.83
In a rentier economy, holding a government office
becomes one of the most effective ways of gaining personal riches and power, and it creates elites who mainly
look after their own interests.84 Nigerian leaders have
ample opportunity to overtly manipulate the political
economy to their advantage through measures such as
preventing repairs to government refineries to benefit
vested interests in imported petroleum products or
stalling construction of much needed power plants to
profit from generator sales.85 Another visible form of
rent seeking is in financial services, where liberalized
rules in the 1980s allowed authorities to steer opportunities to cronies in banking and the privileged could
profit from currency control and foreign exchange
schemes.86 Rent seeking through such overt manipulative methods also encourages illegal transactions such
as petroleum diversion, drug trafficking, and commercial fraud.87 The military elite especially gained
from bunkering through exceptional access to oil, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars of smuggled
petroleum, explaining in part the abiding interest in
politics by high-ranking military officers.88 Since 1975,
it is estimated that $50-$100 billion of Nigeria’s over
$400 billion in oil revenues have “disappeared” to corruption and fraud.89 All of this leads to the practice
of “godfatherism,” where powerful political financers sponsor elected officials in return for “influence in
running of the state, contracts, money, allocation of resources, amenities, employment appointment, etc., in
favour of the godfathers.”90 Little wonder, then, that
“six of the world’s 100 richest men are Nigerian, and
each is politically powerful.”91 Nigeria ranks poorly in
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perception of corruption, with a score of 2.4 out of 10
in 2011, placing it 143rd of 180 countries worldwide.92
Corruption also explains why the elite resort to crime,
including electoral fraud, killing, violence, intimidation, and imprisoning opposition members to protect
their own elite positions.93 On the personal, organizational, and group levels, corrupt policy and institutionalized public crime are demonstrably harmful to
the political economy.
Although clearly a detriment, when some forms
of extralegal public actions are accepted as regular
practices or even encouraged by segments of society,
are they still corruption?94 In Nigeria, a long tradition
of client-patron relationships is ingrained in society,
where northern elites, for example, have ruled for
200 years through patronage and religious support.95
Even if these practices are a customary part of Nigerian life, the extreme to which such conduct has gone,
in comparison to acceptable international norms, has
made Nigeria’s elite seem particularly “venal, partisan, [and] self-serving.”96 Despite President Olusegun
Obasanjo’s declaration of zero tolerance for corruption during his reign from 1999-2007, corruption remained heavy throughout his administration and continues afterwards.97 However, in reaching compliance
in 2011 with the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI), the international standard for financial, physical, and process management of natural resources and their revenues, Nigerian politicians have
displayed rare political will over a contentious aspect
of the problem by implementing a strong governance
regime over their resources.98 That is a good start, but
laws without adequate implementation are of little
help, as abuse of past parliamentary and presidential
type constitutions could not prevent earlier destruc-
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tive partisanship, corruption, and extreme violence in
Nigeria. Even if the Nigerian EITI code should hold,
the parochial political fighting over distribution of
revenues and its attendant evils will continue. Such
revenue is a rich, but finite resource in a poor country.
Strong leadership can correct the problems of weak institutions and properly execute well-intentioned laws,
but Nigeria has seldom seen such leadership. This is
where ethnic, religious, regional, political, and other
interest groups complicate the operation of Nigeria’s
political economy.
THE CAUSES OF CLASHES?
The people of Nigeria are a rich mix of many languages, beliefs, religions, customs, and agricultural
and political systems. Such diversity could be a national strength for the country, but these differences
are more often accentuated to gain advantage for a
group or individual at the expense of the general welfare. This is particularly true in an environment of
limited resources and a declining political or economic order in which people tend to band together into
ethnic, religious, or other groups to better compete
against those not of the same ilk.99 The politicization of
such diversity in Nigeria by its elite “instrumentalizes
identity” for their manipulation, and these groups are
often organized into “Mafia-like associations” used as
“pawns on the chessboard of the political elite.”100 Although control over spoils from the political economy
may be the ultimate motivating force for fracturing
and violence in Nigeria, the splits occur along many
identifiable cultural and regional lines over power
and distribution of public resources.101 Since the mid
1980s, the violence attributed to religious, ethnic, po-
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litical, and economic factors has increased in Nigeria,
with between 12,000 and 18,000 deaths under civilian rule from 1999 to 2009.102 Mass media perceptions
may spotlight cultural grounds for Nigeria’s violence,
but the actual causes are much more interdependent
and complex, as this section shows by examining two
major fault lines in Nigeria among religious and
ethnic groups.
Conflict between the approximately 50 percent of
Nigerians who are Muslim and the 40 percent who are
Christian is the most obvious of the religious conflicts
in the news, since it is easy to differentiate and demonize others, and “exhortations to violence acquire
greater potency once framed in religious terms.”103 As
in some other parts of the world, Islamic movements
in Nigeria seek political reform to conform with religious beliefs or traditional practices, especially in education.104 Since first demanded in 1978, these movements have attained full implementation of sharia
law in nine northern Nigerian states,105 but with accompanying widespread protest and violence killing
thousands of people and displacing whole communities that remain divided and polarized.106 During the
height of the clashes in February 2000, then President
Obasanjo declared the resulting fighting the worst violence since the civil war.107 In response to imposition
of Muslim law and the fear of an agenda to make all
of Nigeria an Islamic state, some states in the southeast, most vocally Cross Rivers, have threatened to
implement “Christian law.”108 Although violence over
sharia’s implementation has since declined, it remains
a constitutional tension between the right to worship
and secular values.109
Within Islam, intrareligious tensions abound. Although Muslim Nigerians are predominately Sufi,
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its adherents within the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya orders have clashed over economic and political power
through much of the 20th century. Both have been
vehemently opposed since the 1970s by the native
Izala group, a Salafist movement, demanding a more
orthodox and public role for Islam against these older
political and religious structures.110 Since the mid1990s, clashes have increased between Sunni and Shia
believers in the north, too.111 Militant Islamism has fomented violence in Nigeria since the Maitatsine sect
unrest of the 1980s. The most recent of these militant
threats is the group popularly known as Boko Haram
(meaning Western education is forbidden, which is
indicative of its principles). Boko Haram operates in
many of the same cities as did the Maitatsine and is
the most violent of militant Salafist groups in Nigeria
today.112 It has claimed responsibility for numerous
terrorist attacks against Christian and government targets that have killed thousands of people since 2003,
including the 2011 bombing of the United Nations
(UN) Nigerian headquarters in Abuja and the 2012
vehicle-born suicide attacks against senior military officers attending church at the Nigerian Armed Forces
Staff College.113 Some northern politicians have used
this group to advance their agenda, but Boko Haram is
not controlled by the northern elites and seems to receive training and assistance from outside supporters,
possibly including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.114
For decades, religious fighting has been reported as a
major cause of violence in Nigeria, and it is indeed a
convenient foil for mustering support groups.
On the surface, religious tensions may explain
some long-term conflicts like those between Muslim
Fulanis and Christian Berom and Tarok in the central
Plateau State, in which, for example, Taroks are accused of killing hundreds and burning 72 villages in
20

2002 and 2003.115 However, this antagonism is more
probably a classic economic conflict between pastoralists and farmers, as suggested by the Catholic
archbishop of Abuja,116 describing tensions as old as
the Cain and Abel teaching revered in both religions.
Numerous cases of interfaith cooperation do exist
throughout Nigeria with, for example, the Yoruba,
one of the three largest ethnic groups of Nigeria, split
among Muslim, Christian, and animist followers who
peacefully coexist in their cities and households.117 In
northern Nigeria, far more cases abound of defused
conflicts, interfaith consultation, and emphasis on tolerance and respect from Christian and Muslim leaders
than are reported.118 When manipulated, religious differences can become a divisive political tool, adding
legitimacy to efforts pursuing power and economic
gain, and it is in this light that such conflicts should
be examined.119
Mobilizing religious groups has been an important
tool in Nigerian politics. Although individual Muslims and Islamic groups are found throughout the
country, they are most concentrated and religiouslypolitically active in the 19 northern predominantly
Muslim states. For them, Islamic identity fosters a regional unity and maintains established privileges for
the elite, especially through controversial demands
for sharia law.120 The Islamic faith rejects the modern
secular Western imperative to separate religious and
political activities, and since the 9th century, when
Islam first arrived in present Nigeria, it has been extensively used by indigenous rulers to legitimize their
rule and organize their lands from the early KanemBorno Empire to the 19th century Sokoto caliphate.121
Conversions from indigenous beliefs to Islam were
often heartfelt but could also be forced, with some
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minorities opposing coercion by instead embracing
Christianity, with the later advantage of associating
with European systems during British rule.122 Jihad
by the people was also used by the great Uthman dan
Fodio in the early-1800s, to fight against the elite who
exploited the people of his day and also to go on to
establish the Sokoto Caliphate and show how mobilization of the faithful could be an agent of change.
That method is still used today by extreme groups like
Boko Haram and some northern politicians who think
they can control it for their own purposes.123 The rise
of Boko Haram, and the Maitatsine unrest before it,
may lay outside the dynamics of the political economy
motivations discussed in this monograph and would
greatly complicate the quelling of internal divisions in
Nigeria should it gain a real following in the country.
Both Muslim and Christian leaders have politicized
their faithful’s allegiance to mobilize and give dignity
to marginalized constituents, demonize opponents,
and gain power since “religion provides a legitimizing framework for violence that would otherwise be
considered unacceptable.”124 Religion, then, is a fast,
easy way to obtain and manipulate power in Nigeria—fighting over position and power rather than developing and delivering relevant policies and political platforms.125 Thus, for decades, sectarian violence
has become a weapon for economic and political gain,
including communal distribution of public resources
and religiously oriented legal structures, through
such overt uses as religious verses in political songs
to burning rival houses of worship.126 Mobilizing religious movements for political causes often brings a
sense of empowerment to the marginalized members
of society. This is sometimes done quite easily, given
the general dissatisfaction of Nigerians with their cir-
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cumstances, and is often easier and quicker than seeking to motivate them through policy and programs.
This may explain why religious beliefs may seem the
cause of violence rather than its tool.127
Although communal rivalry over faith issues is a
factor in Nigeria’s conflicts, religious manipulation
to gain political economic advantage is more the root
cause of divisiveness.128 Political parties in Nigeria
were often organized around regional religious special interest groups. Northerners, with a common history and a more defined regional religious identity,
have been particularly effective at organizing collective action for their region’s benefit, which explains
why northerners have dominated Nigeria politically
through most of its history.129 The Northern People’s
Congress (NPC), for example, was the dominant party
during Nigeria’s formation, and, as part of its persona,
invoked the legacy of the northern Nigerian Islamic
caliphate to its advantage.130 The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), despite its name, also covertly manipulated religion in its strategies to win Muslim votes as
the northern leaning political party that dominated
the Second Republic.131 Although overtly political religious organizations are now banned, Nigeria-wide
Islamic organizations like Jama’atu Nasril Islam protect
their members’ interests, while fostering education
and spreading the faith.132 On the other side, Biafran
separatists were quite successful internationally, portraying their cause as a Christian east resisting dominance by an Islamic north during Nigeria’s civil war.133
During the tumultuous years of 1983 to 1998 between
the Second and Fourth Republics, political parties
were often circumscribed or banned, so mainstream
religious organizations filled the political void as
they “began to resemble political parties; not only did
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they make important demands, they also mobilized
their members.”134 Thus, political activity by religious
groups is deeply rooted in Nigeria, and their rivalries
have set an enduring model of how to effectively mobilize for power.
Conflict among the approximately 250 ethnic and
cultural groups135 of Nigeria is another commonly
depicted source of friction that, like religion, masks
political economic roots.136 Of these many groups,
however, 10 constitute 80 percent of the population,
and only three groups—the closely aligned Hausa and
Fulani in the north (28 percent), Yoruba (20 percent)
in the southwest, and Igbo (17 percent) in the southeast—dominate politics and the economy.137 As with
the NPN and NPC mentioned earlier as examples
of parties which used religious affiliations for political purposes, ethnic allegiance was also the basis for
forming political parties in Nigeria (and since ethnic
and religious identity are often commonly held, there
is much overlap in these processes). Also, like religion,
allegiance is an easy and efficient means to mobilize
support for a political party by saving on recruiting
and organizational time and costs, and assuming the
cloak of social justice among its members while avoiding substantive policy matters.138 This practice traces
back to the British colonial policy of indirect rule, or
Native Authority, under which culturally affiliated
power prevailed through the use of existing traditional ethnic elites. Political parties coalesced around
these self-interest ethnic groups when such activity
was allowed in the 1940s and created an “aggressive
regionalism based on cultural, religious, and economic differences,” which intensified in the politics of
independent Nigeria.139 Ethnic and cultural affiliation
remains a common, if less overt, practice in Nigerian
politics today.
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Powerful political parties into the 1980s often represented regions and “grew out of ethno-religious and
cultural associations” such as the Egbe Omo Oduduwa
in the Yoruba southwest which became the Action
Group; the Jamiyya Mutanem Arewa in the Hausa-Fulani north forming the NPC and Northern Elements
Progressive Union; and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens formed from an array of cultural associations and labor movements primarily in the Igbo
southeast.140 These arrangements, however, left hundreds of minority groups either dependent upon one
of the three major ethnic-regional parties or essentially
disenfranchised, and sometimes resulted in defining
other ethnic groups as political rivals.141 Ethnic parties were important in Nigeria because to advance as
a community meant controlling government to ensure
access to its resources and power. Once in power, the
communal group must dominate to prevent the rise of
competitors.142 These rivalries, based upon ethnic, religious, and regional alliances, waged zero-sum fights
against each other rather than national political parties addressing strategic issues.143
An example of such rivalry comes from one of
Nigeria’s first political crises, which forced the partition of the Midwest Region from the Western Region
in 1963, starting the fragmentation and Balkanization
of Nigerian states.144 At the time, cocoa was Nigeria’s
major export, primarily a rentier product, and grown
mostly in the southwest. An alliance of northern and
southeastern interests assured the alliance’s federal
distribution of cocoa revenues, and was opportunistic
in rending the Western Region as a way to weaken
the Yoruba monopoly over cocoa production. When
oil was discovered in the southeast in 1965, this alliance dissolved and a northern-southwestern alliance
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formed to ensure distribution of oil revenues.145 This
alliance fought Biafran independence when southeastern interests sought full control over oil (and to
counter ethnic violence against Igbos) through secession, leading to a half to two million deaths.146 From
its beginnings, Nigerian politics has been fraught with
political-economic ethnic clashes.
The historic momentum of ethnic based clashes
still roils Nigerian politics but not as overtly as in
its past. Historically, Nigerian political parties were
mainly determined by ethnic affiliation and were often hostile to one another.147 The poisonous effects to
the national well-being from tribal and sectarian political organizations was clear after the Nigerian civil
war, however, and became the catalyst to ban political
parties with ethnic or religious affiliations in the 1979
constitution and again in the 1989 and 1999 constitutions.148 In addition to the prohibition of ethnic and
religious parties, the constitution further stipulates
that political parties contending at the national level
also have countrywide representation to encourage
nationwide support and address national issues. A
Nigerian president must not only win a simple majority of all votes cast in the country, but also at least
25 percent of the vote in two-thirds of the states.149
Within these laws, however, modern Nigerian politics have retained regional, ethnic, and religious biases since political activity was again allowed in 1998.
Modern parties often hold a strong base in a region
associated with an ethnic group or religion such as the
Unity Party of Nigeria and the Alliance for Democracy, both from the southwest, the governing People’s Redemption Party from the north, and the All
Progressive Grand Alliance in the southeast—many
centered around competing elites.150 Despite the ban
on ethnic and religiously based political activity, this
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long Nigerian tradition of ethnic group advocacy and
manipulation continues through ethnically organized
violence for parochial political interests and control of
resources,151 but the law itself may play a role in ethnic
and religious fighting, also.
Despite laws to the contrary, ethnic and religious
affiliations remain an important basis for achieving
political demands and redistribution of public wealth
in Nigeria. As corruption and weak governance continue, Nigerians have found consolidated ethnic
action a better means to meet their expectations.152
The best example of this is in the Niger Delta region
which, although the source of most of Nigeria’s oil
wealth (producing $200 billion in a decade), endures
the lowest standard of living in the republic, suffers
under heavy patronage and corruption, and hosts a
severely degraded environment from the production
of its resources.153 The 60 or so minority groups living
in the delta are mainly disenfranchised and believe
they should receive more than the 18 percent of revenue from their oil wealth that the region currently
receives under Nigeria’s “derivation principle.”154
Not surprisingly, the emerging cultural and political
entity, who call themselves the “Delta People,” also
host Nigeria’s most potent, if currently suppressed,
independence movement and at least two liberation
factions, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and
the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta.155
The “Delta People’s” identity is, in part, a tool of Delta
politicians who encourage its creation and the violent actions of local groups as means to gain greater
share in Nigeria’s oil revenue distribution than they
had been able to obtain through working within
the system.156
The general lack of community security and adequate core government services throughout Nige27

ria has encouraged the rise of vigilantism and ethnic
militias to provide protection through organizations
such as the Odua Peoples Congress, a nationalist Yoruba group, and the Bakassi Boys, Igbo vigilantes—all
of which resort to violent actions to pressure outside
groups to attain their political or economic demands.157
As already shown, the situation in Nigeria is played
as a zero-sum game. Ethnic and religious groups feud
with each other over scarce Nigerian resources and
ideological differences, such that ethnic and religious
clashes remain a chronic problem, with over 40 major
communal clashes recorded from 1999 to 2002.158 In
a randomly selected recent 2-week period in August
2012, 57 people were killed through ethno-religious
clashes and their suppression.159 In all of 2012, the
most deadly year yet, Boko Haram is reported to have
killed about 770 people through terrorist attacks.160 Although such groups and activities are illegal in Nigeria, the groups endure because they need to meet their
members’ needs when the government cannot do so,
despite the cost to the general welfare.
The law itself also makes ethnic battles more common in Nigeria as a venue to assert control over the
political economy. The concept of “indigeneship” is
enshrined in the 1999 constitution as the “’original’
inhabitants of a local government area, or members
of those ethnic groups that trace their lineage back
to the area. All others are considered ‘settlers’ or migrants.”161 Originally this device was meant to preserve
the culture and authority structures of native minorities, but it has become polarizing by excluding some
basic rights of nonindigenes in terms of political participation, land ownership, obtaining a job, or attending school.162 In practice, some citizens have different
rights at the local and national levels, which contra-
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vene other constitutional guarantees of freedom from
discrimination and freedom of movement within the
federation—an ambiguous paradox that creates friction and violence in society.163 These problems arise
when an indigenous population fears domination by
a migrant group with the diminishment of its own
political power and the economic consequences that
may result.164 “Elected officials, in turn, have a strong
incentive to issue certificates [of indigeneship] as a
tool to consolidate local ethnic majorities,” a practice
dating back to the 1960s and giving local officials great
power. However, this practice also leads to “sharp differences in intergroup inequality, intercommunal animosity, and social fragmentation.”165
The differences within regions where principle occupations are either agrarian or pastoral, such as the
Plateau State, exemplify the problems of indigeneship;
though a single political entity, the Plateau encompasses the seams of many religious and ethnic groups
and has become the locale of considerable conflict,
though it had previously epitomized the slogan “home
of peace and tourism.”166 Here indigenous politicians
and groups fear and denigrate Muslim migrants (particularly Hausa and Fulani settlers) desiring to dominate local politics like they once did when Plateau was
part of the former Northern Region before the 1976
“Christian indigene emancipation.”167 Continuing the
example of the agricultural Berom minority, who are
bereft of federal patronage or connections, they have
experienced the abuse of federal power to take away
their lands or pollute them from nearby tin mines,
and fear the better connected Hausa and Fulani will
further displace them as the latter’s powers grow locally.168 The 2002-03 violence by native Tarok in Wase
against Hausa and Fulani villages and the 2004 Tarok
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bloodshed killing of hundreds of Muslim Jarawa were
about “interlopers attempting to claim [indigene]
benefits to which they were not entitled.”169 Such desperation stems from “political marginalizations and
economic deprivation,” compounded by poor governance and opportunistic ethnic leaders.170 Those labeled as migrants see instead a policy that guarantees
an entitlement to local power and resources leading to
corruption and partisanship, which contravenes basic
civil rights in the constitution.171 From Plateau State’s
capital of Jos to the conservative Muslim northern
state of Kaduna to the oil-rich southern Delta State,
and many places in between, “the material ramifications of losing indigeneship are tangible drivers of
[communal and ethnic] violence.”172 Control over political power and economic well-being through the
advantages of indigeneship is the central underlying
factor upon which religious, ethnic, and regional rivalries, violence, and fragmentation occur.173
Even when the law in Nigeria is more straightforward than the confusion over indigeneship, poor
governance and implementation also fosters cultural
conflict over power. The rule of law remains weak in
Nigeria in part because of corrupt and self-serving
leaders who have ample opportunity to bend or ignore even the constitution. Section 11 in the 1999 constitution (and similar sections in earlier constitutions)
specifically bans formation of any state religion, but
that has not stopped full implementation of Islamic
sharia law in nine northern states and partial implementation in three more.174 In another example, the
law that ensures wide representation in different
ethnic regions of the country in presidential elections
was flaunted during the 1979 elections that initiated
the short-lived Second Republic. In that election, the
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required representation of two-thirds of the then
19 states in Nigeria was assumed to round up to 13
states. However, the leading contender, Alhaji Shehu
Shagari, received the necessary 25 percent representation in only 12 states. To avoid a run-off election,
the Nigerian Supreme Court reinterpreted two-thirds
to mean 12 2/3 states, and awarded the presidency to
Sharari based on a contrived geographic-mathematic
interpretation.175 These are just two examples of why,
“It is often said that it is not good constitutions that
Nigeria lacks, but good leadership.”176
Another constitutional principle, “federal character,” is meant to accommodate “diversity, fostering inclusiveness and promoting national unity” in
staffing the federal government.177 Such seemingly
beneficial ethnic balancing, however, has led to informal provisions like the zoning system to apportion
federal employment.178 This extralegal arrangement
splits Nigeria into six geopolitical zones,179 and at its
highest levels aims to power share the top federal
positions among the regional elites on a rotational
basis. Although meant to foster harmony, its implementation is neither democratic nor meritocratic, and
is already skewed by the election of the “south-south
zone” President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 over expectations (and subsequent violence) by northerners
that their region’s candidate deserved the nomination
of the ruling People’s Democratic Party.180 The good
news from these elections is that they were considered
the most democratic since 2000, and the election of a
minority Ijaw as president holds promise for a more
democratic future in Nigeria.181 A lack of a shared national identity, however, leaves Nigerian politics open
to these types of machinations among rival political,
economic, cultural, and regional interests.
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Given the conditions in Nigeria, cultural and regional fighting over political economic power seems
unavoidable. Hostility over scarce but valuable assets,
such as patronage and public revenue distributions,
“becomes inevitable under conditions that politicize
ethnicity and enlist governmental powers in socioeconomic competition.”182 Group interest theory expects people with common interests to band together
to influence public policy, with each group’s strength
depending upon its numbers, wealth, organizational
strength and leadership, access to power, and internal cohesion—the latter including ethnic or religious
affiliations.183 Cultural groupings seem necessary to
maintain or improve economic well-being by those
involved, often through the power obtained from
politics.184 This situation inspires the Nigerian euphumism to “get their fair share of the national cake . . .
to loot enough resources to dispense to their villages
or among their ethnic group.”185 When one group
becomes institutionally dominant in a society, the
government may lose its ability to cope with societal
changes, which may be destabilizing.186 For much of its
history, the Nigerian government and military have
been dominated by northerners, leading southerners to push for more “decentralization of the federal
government and constitutional changes.”187 Northerners, for their part, fear that liberalization of the Nigerian system will diminish their dominant position in
politics.188 Entrenched positions and competition for
limited resources have fostered ethnic and religious
conflicts over power and wealth.
Nigeria’s diversity along its many cultural and regional lines may seem to be the cause of its problems;
however, those differences are often the weapons
wielded by elites of the powerful groups for their own
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gain in political power and economic spoils.189 Elites
from all of the regions not only tolerate the gross inequality their system entails, but also feel entitled to
it, despite the greater ensuing harm to social and economic development and political stability in Nigeria.190
The instrumentalization of identity by Nigerian elites
over who receives existing public resources rather
than developing those resources further is a failure of
good governance and leadership. Thus, deadly fractures occur ethnically, religiously, and regionally that
upset stability in Nigeria and may threaten its very
unity. While democracy now seems to be taking root
and the economy grows, Nigeria’s many past cycles
of autocracy and stagnant economic growth leave the
country brittle and exposed.
NIGERIAN INSTABILITY
Nigeria’s importance to U.S. interests stems from
its towering political, economic, and demographic influence in Africa, and its rich natural resources and
market potential. This is true, however, only while Nigeria remains a functioning integrated state. Thus, the
United States, along with the rest of the world, maintains an interest in the viability of Nigeria; as the 2006
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations notes, “disruption of supply from Nigeria would
represent a major blow to the oil security strategy of
the U.S.”191 As this monograph has shown, however,
Nigeria is under considerable internal pressure over
power and spoils through competing regional, religious, and ethnic camps that have racked it with
chronic and severe violence to the point of fracturing.
Since its independence, the internal political divisions
in Nigeria have increased from three to four in 1963,
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to 12 in 1967 (to unsuccessfully counter the Biafran secession), to 19 in 1976, to 21 in 1987, to 30 in 1991, and
to 36 in 1996. A call for an additional 35 states in 1994
was ignored by the framers of the 1999 constitution in
an apparent effort to stabilize the situation and halt
further fracturing.192 As many of the past problems
that have caused fragmentation continue, mismanagement of a recurring economic downturn or periodic
political crisis by the country’s elite in the current inflammatory ethnic and religious environment could
again result in the need for force to keep the brittle
state unified.193 Although causes for the devolution of
the Nigerian state are clearly the power and spoils of
the political economy using its ready religious, ethnic,
and regional factions, those alone are probably not
sufficient for the breakup or failing of the country. Despite its present strains, Nigeria currently remains a
functioning and influential state to the extent needed
by Nigerian and outside interests.194 Under what conditions, then, could this balance tip into more dire circumstances? This section analyzes the possibility and
gravity of Nigeria’s political stability as an incentive
to consider this monograph’s conclusions and the recommendations that follow.
Parceling a state along cultural divides is an oftused means to diversify power and reduce minority
fears of domination by stronger groups.195 Despite its
good intentions, though, subdividing Nigeria has encouraged the worst in parochial self-serving activities,
as unrelenting violence and political machinations
show.196 Splintering is a means to reduce a rival’s
power when sparring over the political economy, as
occurred in 1963 with the forced partition of the Western Region; it was also a means to reduce the strength
of the oil-rich Eastern Region during the civil war.197
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Subdivisions entrench a state’s majority group in its
local power, but this method may also undermine a
dominant group when a minority succeeds in subdividing again to create new majority groups in smaller
states.198 The allure of devolution includes creating
new patronage opportunities within ethnic constituencies and controlling wealth distributed by the federal government.199 Subdividing, however, weakens
each of the states with respect to the central government, as smaller, less viable states are essentially obligated to federal officials for revenue and patronage in
order to operate.200 Officials also used the creation of
new states as a “diversionary tactic” from the need to
address the causes of economic and political problems
rather than just their cultural symptoms.201 One procedural technique tried to counter devolution, but made
the situation worse when sharing public revenue from
the central government to the states did not ensure fealty to the country. This occurred because the distribution formula gave a fixed amount to each state and
an allowance for its population, which became an incentive to create more states, since that would ensure
an increased amount of the fixed dividend without
reducing the proportional amount received for population.202 For these reasons, Nigeria has fragmented
throughout its history, and recent policies have sought
to counter this devolutionary trend.
If internal fragmenting is clearly an existing pressure within the Nigerian polity, what additional
forces might push the state to break up? Paul Collier
and Anke Hoeffler examined the political economy
of secession and found that secessionist communities
formed when they perceived an economic advantage
to do so. Although such an advantage was not the
only way to motivate secession, it was a particularly
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potent method. An additional economic characteristic
enabling secession occurs when the economic advantage, often a lucrative natural resource like oil or cocoa, is spatially concentrated so that an identity group
might coalesce around it. Nigeria, with its dependence
on oil exports from the southern part of the country,
is thus prone to secession,203 as Biafra (and the still active, if small, Igbo Movement for Actualization of the
Sovereign State of Biafra) and the more recent Niger
Delta insurgency have shown.204 The relatively prosperous southwest Yoruba region is a geographically
concentrated ethnic group with a natural resource, cocoa, associated with civil conflict and smoldering autonomy and secession movements since the 1990s.205
Normally, more control over economic resources is
only one of several grievances declared for secession,
as the Niger Delta Now website shows by also citing
greed; disenfranchisement; educational and health
inequality; and ethnic, religious, and gender discrimination as grounds for independence.206 Political control over native economic resources, however, would
solve many other existing problems, and thus could be
a spur toward partition. Economically richer regions
with concentrated ethnic groups, like some of Nigeria’s southerners who feel politically dominated by
northerners and economically exploited, set the stage
for internal divisions to grow into independence.207
Concentrated resources may actually create the
identity groups necessary to begin a secession movement. The use of terms like tribe, ethnic groups, and
nations are amorphous in a society as complex as Nigeria’s, and cultural allegiances and designations may
shift. During the Nigerian civil war, many southeastern people associated themselves with the Igbo movement to create Biafra, as it was a viable means to re-

36

gional political independence and increased economic
wealth. Most of these same groups annulled their relationship with the Igbo people and renounced the Biafra movement after defeat.208 Ethnic determination is
neither definitive nor static in Nigeria and often based
on 19th century European designations of convenience
because true Nigerian cultural associations are multifaceted and often indistinct. For example, the concept
of a “Delta People” is being developed to bring together over 60 disparate groups in the Niger River Delta
region to create their own identity as part of a political
process for greater control over economic resources and
development prospects.209
The opportunity for increased wealth may be more
important than past grievances in forming an identity
group bent upon secession, especially if the population
is uneducated and susceptible to an exaggerated sense
of common identity, and the imperative to control localized resources is strong.210 For example, in Biafra,
oil was located along the coast around Port Harcourt
and not the inland Igbo cultural core around Enugu,
necessitating the creation of a greater Igboland to gain
support for secession.211 Experience with autonomy
or previous secessionist ambitions is another factor in
secession, and one which may help determine where
future Nigerian divisions occur.212 Thus, convenient
ethnic loyalties based around economic advantage
are a strong factor in state fracturing, and Nigeria’s
history indicates that the potential for devolution
remains strong.
Should mismanagement of circumstances in Nigeria cause the state to break up, the new states would
likely form along lines of past politically autonomous
regions.213 Such regions are often the historic shorthand for traditional divisions reflecting differences in
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physical geography, agricultural and economic zones,
and religious and ethnic peoples that, together, define
distinct and internally homogenous areas. So, in addition to the modern construct of a compact economic
resource and sense of exploitation around which an
identity group may form, a distinct historic contiguous political territory is another trait of secession since
it is an easily recognized rallying point for its members. Elsewhere in Africa, similar historic splits are
found between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland, and North and South Sudan.214
In Nigeria, these splits existed under the early British imperial administration, based on the differences
found in older precolonial native states. The 19th century Fulani Sokoto Caliphate and Hausa-dominated
remnants of the centuries-old Bornu Empire were first
absorbed by British royal charter companies in 1885
and officially annexed as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900.215 Similarly, Nigeria’s southwest
contained Yoruba-dominated states, including the
Kingdoms of Oyo, Benin, and Warri.216 This area was
first ruled by the British when Lagos and surrounding areas were annexed in 1861 to combat the slave
trade and formally incorporated as the Colony and
Protectorate of Lagos in 1886.217 True to their cultural heritage, the people of the southeast traditionally
governed themselves in decentralized communities,
setting them apart from the other regions and making the subsequent indirect rule by the British difficult
and inefficient.218 The British, nonetheless, established
a patchwork of protectorates starting in 1849 with the
Bight of Biafra, followed by the Bight of Benin, Brass,
Bonny, Opobo, Aobh, and Old Calabar. In 1885, these
protectorates, stretching from the Niger River eastward to Old Calabar, were assembled into the Oil Riv-
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ers Protectorate and re-established as the Niger Coast
Protectorate in 1893 and the Protectorate of Southern
Nigeria in 1900.219
Each of these three regions was administered separately within the British Empire until 1906 when Lagos
was incorporated into an enlarged Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. The Northern and Southern Protectorates joined in 1914, because the North
was unable to sustain itself economically and to create
the external borders of modern Nigeria.220 Although
adjusted somewhat with time and better understanding of the areas along the internal borders, the lines
defining these three key pre-unification areas in Nigeria have remained remarkably durable and significant
as relict boundaries within modern Nigeria.221 Indeed,
the north and south continued to be administered separately within the united Colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria, and the three regions resurfaced in 1939 when
the British created internal political divisions as the
Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions, each organized differently for internal self-governing to reflect
their separate heritages.222 In 1954, these regions were
reaffirmed under the Lyttleton constitution, which,
along with the federal territory in Lagos, became the
internal political structure of Nigeria upon independence in 1960.223 The Biafran secessionists drew upon
the legacy of the Eastern Region and its predecessors
for legitimacy, as recent Yoruba separatists draw
upon the Western Region legacy. Interestingly, Nigeria’s most potent secessionist movement today, in the
Niger Delta, also has its own legacy bound in part to
the Midwestern Region (first of the devolution states
in the federal republic), the British Oil Rivers Protectorate, and the native Benin and Warri Kingdoms to
create its identity, although that has not been an important element so far in the insurgency.
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Despite the delineation of British drawn lines
of convenience presented here as enduring internal
boundaries, the divides are culturally and geographically less distinct, but the regions’ divisions remain
potent.224 The Middle Belt, the southern length of the
old Northern Region, including Plateau State, is a
transition area of some 180 native ethnic groups partially swayed by northern and southern, Muslim and
Christian, and Arab and European influences and is
one of Nigeria’s most violent regions.225 The Niger
River Delta region is also as indistinct a cultural border, with over 60 disparate ethnic groups, as the river
delta itself is an indistinct physical border between
Yorubaland and Igboland.226 Indeed, the delta may
constitute a discrete buffer zone through its physical,
cultural, economic, and historic identities, real or constructed. Although such intermingling of allegiances
and economic interests across Nigeria’s internal divides makes secession difficult, violent partitions occurred under similar circumstances between India and
Pakistan in 1947 and between the two Sudans in 2011.
Regional, religious, and ethnically inspired violence harnessed by venal leaders has fragmented Nigeria and its people for political and economic gain
at the expense of the state. Economically advanced
regions in southern Nigeria may be motivated to secede out of the dominating control of the north, using
the opportunity offered by their concentrated natural
resource advantages. The desire to secede could also
fashion the narrative to do so, by creating new coalitions of peoples into an identity group to justify and
support separation. Such new identities are especially
possible where education levels are low and a history of regional autonomy or previous secession is
strong—both conditions found in Nigeria. The danger

40

of the predatory political economy in Nigeria is that
it may cause the disintegration of the Nigerian state
through enabling these mechanisms. With this very
real potential outcome in mind, what can be done to
secure Nigeria’s long-term unity as a stable functioning state while maintaining U.S. regional interests?
RELEVANT FINDINGS
The essence of this analysis is to explore the main
causes of conflict and violence in Nigeria and to explain how those causes relate to one another beyond
what is casually understood as common wisdom. In
Nigeria, limited or diminishing opportunity and economic disruptions have led to extremely debilitating
parochial interests, and they have ignited deadly social and political conflict that is manipulated by corrupt elites.227 The interactions of the economy, politics,
and society are also recognized as fundamental causes
of many intrastate conflicts by U.S. Army Field Manual
(FM) 5-0, The Operations Process, and is certainly borne
out in Nigeria. Although such analysis simplifies a
very complicated problem in which deeply held religious convictions, fears for ethnic survival, sincere
ideological beliefs, societal aspirations, local concerns,
population growth, and other human forces play a
role, these contributing factors are removed or reduced
to a manageable level found in more stable states if
the ramifications of a fractured political economy are
properly addressed. The emphasis on the political
economy as the heart of Nigeria’s problems should
not diminish these other concerns. It does, however,
highlight the core problem to help U.S. Government
agencies better concentrate on and address those issues and not their symptoms. To accomplish this, this
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section will examine some complications in the U.S.Nigerian relationship, as well as three lessons foreigners need to understand when dealing with Nigerians,
and will make some recommendations on how the
U.S. military could organize and support Nigerian
stability better.
The Design Process, articulated in FM 5-0 and
growing in the U.S. military as an important analysis and problem management tool, stresses the crucial
importance of examining complex challenges like stability and fracturing in Nigeria. It starts with understanding the conditions around a situation and identifying the right problem as two critical methods that
this monoraph has already attempted to do. As FM 5-0
explains the process, it is well-suited for understanding circumstances in Nigeria and how the U.S. Government may approach them better by “examin[ing]
the symptoms, the underlying tensions, and the root
causes of conflict. . . .”228 To manage or solve the identified problem, the Design Process next requires that
critical thinking be applied to adapt affected processes
to a dynamic environment to achieve desired goals.
Long-standing U.S. national security goals involving
mutual economic advancement, good governance
that fairly manages internal divisions, and stable and
prosperous regions around the world also apply to
Nigeria. With critical thinking in “complex situations
that involve political, social, economic, and other factors . . .,” the Design Process warns that, “Well intentioned guidance without detailed study may lead to
an untenable or counterproductive solution. . . .”229
Understanding the operational environment, as already presented here, improves decisionmaking and
enables integration of the expertise and resources of
many U.S. Government, Nigerian, and international
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assets to best tailor an approach to these problems. FM
5-0 also reminds practitioners that “Design encourages the commander and staff to seek and address
complexity before attempting to impose simplicity.”230
With this process in mind, this section will examine
the complications that hobble U.S. engagement in
Nigeria and why there are only limited steps that the
DoD may take in supporting a broader U.S. and international effort to assist Nigerians in managing their
own stability and prosperity issues to keep them from
becoming larger ones in which the United States must
get involved.
Complicating Factors for Outside Support
to Nigeria.
The circumstances that created and prolong
Nigeria’s problems are difficult and complex for Nigerians, but the solution is even more vexing for interested foreign organizations, like the U.S. Government, to
influence. With an establishment crippled by structural problems, accumulated past mistakes, poverty, and
entrenched distrust, a transforming Nigerian democracy must reform its system and institutions while enlightening an elite and electorate beyond entrenched
short-term partisan interests.231 These problems are
compounded in a young democracy by chronic pent
up demands and rivalries without the benefit of accepted societal standards of conduct and established
institutional procedures.232 Although non-Nigerians
may suggest, influence, and support solutions, every
potential improvement must be accepted and primarily implemented by the Nigerians for the sake of legitimacy and efficacy. Nigeria’s political economy
problems are deeply entrenched and, as mainly internal problems of a proud people, will not lend them43

selves easily to foreign involvement, especially military influence, for three reasons: Nigeria’s insularity,
dependence of both sides on oil trade, and the limited
expertise of military forces on the fundamental causes
of the political economy problems.
Nigeria’s regional influence and military power,
economic strength, especially in energy exports, and
large and diverse population make it one of the key
strategic American partners in Africa. Yet, these very
characteristics that make Nigeria so important to the
United States also insulate it from outside influence or
pressures.233 The decades of steady flow of U.S. aid to
Nigeria is an obvious source of American influence;
however, such aid simply directs attention to policy
issues of American interest, while the Nigerian government’s immense source of independent energy
revenues and diplomatic stature significantly limit any
American leverage through this venue in which the
Nigerians are not also interested. The best example of
this insularity came during the military dictatorship
of President Sani Abacha during the 1990s, a low point
in modern Nigerian history, during which U.S. foreign assistance to Nigeria dropped to two token programs, but with little effect on the dictatorial actions
of the regime.234 Nigerian internal rifts also make embracing U.S. agendas or close personal relationships
with American leaders anathema, as when President
Olusegun Obasanjo was derided by both Sunni and
Shia Hausa leaders as “the U.S.’s boy” during political
clashes.235 Indeed, the governments under Presidents
Obsanajo, Yar’adua, and Jonathan throughout the
2000s routinely have resisted international assistance
for sovereignty and vested interest reasons, which is
a situation not likely to change soon.236 Through 2012,
U.S. Government officials found it difficult to even
obtain visas for official business in Nigeria, which is
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symptomatic of the distance maintained in the relationship between the two nations.237 Any engagement
by the U.S. Government to help solve Nigerian problems thus must also be embraced by the Nigerians because it is unlikely to be imposed unilaterally.
Despite Nigeria’s political distancing from foreign
influence, relations with the United States have generally been pragmatic, in part due to close economic ties.
To continue the state distributed energy revenues that
all Nigerians support, Nigeria must integrate into the
global economy to sell its oil, import food and materials, receive investments and expertise, and conduct
its financial business—which leaves some areas for
external assistance and influence. Even during the
Abacha regime when official contacts were confrontational between the two states, American commercial
firms, especially major oil companies, operated normally and even expanded their investments in Nigeria because both sides benefitted.238 The necessity for
Nigeria to export its oil to maintain its domestic status
quo, its reliance on a single export commodity, and
the fungibility of oil on the world market all suggest
points where the two sides may find areas of influence
and cooperation.239 However, maintaining the crucial
balance in energy trade, and its associated requirements like investment and relative stability between
the two states means that other interests like good
governance, democratization, and corruption reduction may languish when both sides do not agree.240
Thus, although there is some leverage between Nigeria and the United States in the economic realm, any
changes that American officials would like to make
there will have to be made through persuasion and
mutual agreement.

45

The security arm of the U.S. Government has an
even harder role in supporting advancement of U.S.
goals in Nigeria. First, given the analysis of this monograph, the Nigerian and international communities
should recognize that they do not face security problems as much as economic, political, and social ones;
and that any fixes will be mainly in those domains.
The role of international defense forces may only be to
enable the more fundamental fixes with prerequisite
security support or oblique assistance to the other domains. Such support by the military must also be indirect because if the Nigerian government maintains its
distance from foreign influence, the Nigerian military
is even more nationalistic and independent.
A further complication for foreign military influence in Nigeria is that the root cause of Nigeria’s problems, political and economic, are not amenable to the
sort of skills that military forces are good at, nor would
it be an appropriate example for them to attempt such
a mission, short of a military occupation under conditions as found in Iraq or Afghanistan where civil
authority no longer functioned. Much of the Nigerian
populace would be hostile to direct foreign military
influence, since half the population of Nigeria is Muslim. With the worldwide ummah’s deep resentment
of American actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine,
and other places in the Muslim domain, an American
military presence in Nigeria would probably only exacerbate an already bad situation.241 Thus, although
it may be difficult to do, former Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates’ injunction for the War on Terrorism is
equally salient in supporting national stability when
he said “the most important military component . . .
is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we
enable and empower our partners to defend and gov-
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ern their own countries.”242 Thus it may be limited, but
U.S. military forces do have a contribution to make to
Nigerian stability.
Although the difficulty for foreigners to influence
the policies of another state is accepted wisdom, the
importance of a stable and unified Nigeria to U.S. interests means the United States must remain engaged
and keep as a priority the effort to avert a failed or
fractured state resulting from internal tensions that
are poorly managed by Nigerian elites.243 A U.S. Army
futures exercise, Unified Quest 2008, explored the
possibility of the demise of Nigeria as we know it and
found a politically fractured country a distinct possibility. During this exercise, the government of Nigeria
failed to adequately recognize it was losing control
within its state “to a circle of elites who have seized resources and are trying to perpetuate themselves.” Yet
U.S. reactions to the situation “were contingent upon
what green [the Nigerian government] was willing to
tolerate and accommodate.”244 With these caveats concerning the complexities of U.S. influence in Nigeria,
this monograph will make some meaningful, if limited, suggestions for U.S. military involvement. These
suggestions strive to emphasize gains made by the
U.S. military in building upon cultural understanding
over the past decade and, in particular, the focusing of
aligned units within specific missions to better enable
security assistance to meet U.S. interests.
In Nigeria, engagement entails understanding the
complexity of its system by foreigners to avoid simplistic or inappropriate responses and to prevent reinforcing counterproductive actions. To address the
“wicked problem” that Nigeria represents, and for
which the Design Process is well suited, the U.S. Military Academy’s Minerva Research Initiative observes,
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No longer are military operations won by the most
powerful physical force, but rather victory often goes
to the smarter, information-dominant, culturally
aware, net-centric force.245

These observations are not a checklist, but rather
are recommended U.S. perspectives and organizational focus that better support the reforms that U.S. and
Nigerian government officials determine are needed.
Other studies have made many useful substantive recommendations, but the ideas presented here should
shape the U.S. military players to better examine and
implement these ideas and to handle those that will
emerge with time. Through all of this, insight about
Nigeria is key, and leveraging that knowledge will
produce smarter decisions and a more constructive
relationship. This approach will entail bolstering Nigerian institutional development coupled with a balanced engagement that addresses the issues of corruption, conflict, economic growth, and social and
economic justice as much as foreigners are able. A
more tailored, focused, and cooperative approach may
prove to be the most effective method during coming
austere times.246
Three Lessons Foreigners Need to Understand
When Working with Nigerians.
Despite the analysis of this monograph and modern examples of states like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Sudan, and Ethiopia devolving along cultural
fractures, readers may find the demise of modern
Nigeria sensational. There are certainly pressures on
state unity, but unity has prevailed. Indeed, there are
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considerable centripetal forces, as the next section will
show, but centrifugal forces are also strong, and many
Nigerians doubt a unified Nigeria really exists.
The first lesson foreigners should know when dealing with Nigeria is that the state’s breakup is a real
possibility if the Nigerian elite mismanage an acute
crisis or one of Nigeria’s chronic problems. Abukar
Tafawa Balewa, who would become Nigeria’s first
native Prime Minister, summed up succinctly many
Nigerians’ doubts concerning their country’s indivisibility when, in 1948, he proclaimed, “Many [Nigerians] deceive themselves by thinking that Nigeria is
one. . . . This is wrong. I am sorry to say that this presence of unity is artificial.” Although Balewa was from
the north, members from all of the cultural groups in
Nigeria subscribe to such doubts and promote ethnic,
religious, regional, or other loyalties over those to the
country.247 The potential for breakup is real because
most Nigerians lack “a broad social compact that
would establish consensus on national identity and the
meaning of citizenship.”248 Without nationally shared
values or primary allegiance to their country, Nigerians may be wanting in the constitutional fortitude
needed to overcome their many other differences and
manage the deep and endemic political and economic
problems around which Nigeria is rift. The root of
these conflicts can be traced back to the colonial epoch
when the new political economy lumped the various
people together in a forced new social intercourse. The
newly foisted consciousness was readily exploited, 249
resulting in a twisted polity, and, to this day, most Nigerians maintain stronger allegiance to their lineage
than to their country. Combine such sentiment with
a sequence of political fracturing, a history of civil
war, external pressures, and large-scale internal violence, and ignite it with a mismanaged crisis—loose
49

Nigerian talk of separation could inadvertently lead
to fracturing.
The second lesson foreigners need to know is that
civil war or the breakup of Nigeria is not inevitable,
since few Nigerians want it. That both the state could
fail and that few truly want it to is part of the complexity of Nigeria, which must be understood and
managed. The fact that both sentiments exist in each
of the power groups, from the military to the minorities, is because most everyone benefits from Nigeria’s
economic unity even while they jockey for a greater
share of it through the political economy.250 Myopic
leaders may take their constituents to the brink, but
arrangements are inevitably found (with one truly unfortunate exception in the Nigerian civil war) through
“key sources of bargaining and accommodation that
help to maintain a fragile equilibrium.”251 Such arrangements also date back to the colonial period, and
their successes are more common than depicted in the
violence-besotted media.252 In the northern state of
violence-prone Kaduna, for example, the Committee
on Inter-Religious Harmony is chaired by the governor to identify causes of friction in order to resolve
them.253 Similar organizations calming emotion and
promoting harmony are found elsewhere in Nigeria,
including the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic
Affairs and Jama’atu Nasril Islam, which broker peace
among various Muslim groups and others. More of
such intercommunal dialog will build reconciliation
and may resolve the economic, political, and cultural
underpinnings that spur violence, and would thus
hobble the influence of fringe groups like Boko Haram.254 As universally appealing as reconciliation may
appear, however, this is a form of social justice more
in keeping with the Christian doctrine of forgiveness
than, for instance, Muslim Hausa “focus on punish50

ment as a deterrent.”255 There are difficulties doing so,
but bridging activities at all levels are part of the solution in Nigeria.
In another paradox, a case may be made that there
are, indeed, shared values among Nigerians with
which to bind them as one nation. One period when
Nigerians were more unified and proud came during their economic peak in the 1970s when prosperity was shared, development advanced, Nigeria was
widely respected, and its future seemed bright. That
this occurred once means that such unity and national
purpose could be harnessed again, absent the corruption and poor governance that have felled the country
since.256 Dr. Adiele Afigbo, Nigeria’s first great native
historian, also finds greater interdependence in precolonial Nigeria through complementary economic,
cultural, and historic links among various states and
ethnic groups.257 Forms of cross-cultural interactions
existed in terms of “religious, social, and cultural
agencies such as age-grade associations, secret societies, marriage ties, and oracle practices,” as well as
shared ideas and wandering scholars. At the same
time, there were divisive influences at work such as
interethnic wars and the competition brought about
by the slave trade.258 Thus, Nigeria may have always
had coherence although, at times, also internal discord.259 Building a sense of unity by developing or reintroducing common bonds across Nigerian society is
another very important step in maintaining a unified
Nigerian state, especially to establish the conditions
upon which other solutions are needed.260 However,
shy of becoming a common enemy for Nigerians as
the British were during the independence movement,
foreigners need to understand this phenomenon, but
be judicious in how they support a Nigerian nation
concept, lest it be misperceived as something artifi51

cial and foisted on the Nigerian people. Resolving the
underpinnings of the political economy, while developing a sense of national identity, are sure ways to
Nigerian stability, integrity, and progress.
The third lesson for foreigners to understand,
as part of their interactions with Nigerians, is that
although ineffective or corrupt leadership is a major
cause of its problems, Nigeria’s institutions have been
incapable of curbing abuse of power or ensuring effective and equitable governance.261 This is, in part, due
to many standard Western perspectives and forms not
mixing well with Nigerian ways, but the native Nigerian ways have not coalesced well together either.
Nigeria’s main regions represent three traditional
styles of self-governance. To the north, caliphates
and kingdoms used a hierarchical Islamic-sanctioned
structure of government.262 In the southwest, the Yoruba governed through a highly organized set of urban based kingdoms that depended on the rule of local chiefs. The subtribal stage of development of the
Sobo, Ibo, and Ibibio groups east of the Niger “[was]
where political development had not advanced beyond the clan and family stage [and] where the concept of chieftaincy had made little progress”263 relying
instead on consensual rule. To amalgamate these disparate systems after the 1914 integration of Nigeria, its
first Governor-General, Fredrick Lugard, instituted a
form of indirect British control264 through local rulers
and structures as “the best way to govern them . . .
through the institutions which they themselves
had invented.”265
Although a well-intentioned approach, his inflexible application worked only in the authoritarian
north upon which he modeled his ideas and where
existed an overlordship system to which the British
could relate. Southern systems were less hierarchical,
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and in the southeast, in particular, no major leaders
existed, forcing the British to create such leaders to
work through “an inorganic process,” to the dismay
of its people.266 By independence in 1960, the British
had modified this system to better account for cultural
differences by allowing some southern legislators to
be elected rather than appointed, and instituting a
Regional House of Chiefs as a Western Region government body.267 Nonetheless, alien colonial rule in
Nigeria “twist[ed] indigenous structures and relations
until they were ineffective, but [did not replace] them
sufficiently with Western substitutes.”268
Nigerians’ native governing systems and the British attempt to govern through them failed, damaging
discourse within the political economy. However, unlike the English language, which become the lingua
franca among its many people, Western governing
styles have served modern Nigeria no better.
If colonial rule and forced integration have made
indigenous governing schemes dysfunctional in Nigeria,269 modern attempts at ruling through Western
style governance have fared no better. Nigeria has had
four different democratic republics, using both British
parliamentary and American presidential structures,
with dubious performances, although judgment on the
current fourth republic must be reserved. Divisive civilian administrations inevitably led to military coups
or authoritarian regimes.270 The historian Afigbo believed that Western governance and economic models
did not evolve to address Nigerian political and social
conditions and thus remain unsuited for their adopted
purposes.271 One example is the poor results from federalism, where protection, participation, and equality
for Nigerian minorities and regions are disregarded
by entrenched sectional parochial interests to the detriment of the national good.272 Another example of
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the difficulty in applying Western structures is found
in the courts of justice, which are often corrupt and
backlogged in Nigeria, making local tribal and sharia
courts a possible supplement for justice. Customary
courts benefit from being more accessible and sensitive to ethnic and religious values, and they may enjoy
more legitimacy than formal courts. However, they
may also be dominated by local elites and traditional
powers and be insensitive to aspirations supporting
equality for women and minorities and other modern values.273 Neither Western nor native governing
schemes seem to be a sure route to better governance
in modern Nigeria. Thus, part of the complexity of
Nigeria is that it seeks to advance along Western economic and political norms to benefit from a globalized
environment, but neither its indigenous nor imported
forms of government have worked satisfactorily within
that environment.
What Nigerians endure are corrupted political and
economic systems that have become the battleground
for a myriad of self-serving groups, some motivated
by religious fervor or ethnic aspirations, but all lacking any real sense of nationalism, seeking to divide
revenues from a rich but finite shared natural resource
governed by mechanisms ill-suited to the task. Although a daunting indictment, each of these listed issues could be managed and improved by good leadership, the collective lack of which amounts to Nigeria’s
most grievous failing in terms of internal security as
much as political, economic, and social fairness.274 No
matter how perfected the political structure, how rich
its economic output, or how dynamic and productive
its people, with inadequate or corrupt leadership at
the local, state, and federal level, Nigeria will find it
difficult to improve its situation.275
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As this analysis has shown, there are signs of improvement in terms of progress and internal conflict
mediation. Perhaps some Nigerian leaders have seen
the need to support national interests or have felt some
of the pressure from abroad, but these changes may
be tenuous. The best way to ensure lasting improvement in Nigeria’s condition is by its people no longer
tolerating the corrupt, partisan, and violent ways of
the past. This would entail making Nigeria’s diversity
and many institutions work for all, and not just some,
which is a tall order for a people so inured to business as it has evolved. To attain stability and prosperity, Nigerians must reform their people’s and leaders’
concepts of allegiances, share political and economic
power and benefits, and work within accepted structures and processes. One piece of that change is in the
security sector. Western solutions may not be the best
ones for Nigeria, and native solutions should be given
leeway, although those are not assured either. There
have been many actions proposed for Nigeria by outsiders, and some will probably be helpful, but until
the key insights outlined here are understood and
used to guide future actions, successful influence may
be feeble. To ensure these lessons are better applied
in any future actions, some specific recommendations
to the U.S. Government, and particularly the military,
are offered.
RECOMMENDATIONS: WHAT THE AMERICAN
MILITARY CAN DO
It bears repeating that security solutions in Nigeria may be necessary but are not decisive in amending the situation there. To support Nigeria’s transition
to civilian democratic rule, U.S. foreign assistance
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climbed from $7 million in 1998 to $109 million in 2001
to $243 million in 2011, displaying a steady growth in
engagement that covered areas of mutual interest.276
These interests emphasized the economic and political domains, which are, at best, indirectly affected by
U.S. military efforts.277 U.S. foreign assistance spending in Nigeria reflects this diminished foreign military
role, with an average of less than $2 million per year
(only $.5 million in 2011) going to support the Peace
and Security category. Nearly three-quarters of total
U.S. assistance ($181 million) went to the health sector (with HIV/AIDs [$129 million] and malaria [$15
million]grants dominating), while $32 million went to
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance; $14 million to Economic Development; and $11 million to Education and Social Services.278 These latter categories
address the ingrained political economy problems in
Nigeria, but U.S. support has been shrinking because
the results from 15 years of investment in political and
economic reform have been disappointing. Nigeria’s
ability to use external assistance effectively seems limited, which is one of the complications of supporting
that country.279 With few U.S. initiatives to support in
other fields, security sector assistance to combat Nigerian political economy woes are narrow and often focused on fundamental stability, upon which political
and economic reform is based. However, the complications noted of accepting aid and the capacity to use
external assistance effectively means more funding is
useful only if it enables creative collaborative actions
that attack the political economy problem.280 Nigeria
has the financial resources for reform but lacks the
will, so it needs American ideas and counsel more
than it may need additional U.S. funds.
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Even if the direction of U.S. assistance funding
does not reflect the importance of political and economic problems in Nigeria, discussions about governance, economics, and security are central to the
U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission—a regular collaborative forum consisting of the highest members
of the DoS, Foreign Ministry, and other government
agencies, to discuss items of pressing mutual interest.
Since 2010, four working groups have covered crucial
issues in good governance and transparency, energy
and investment, food security and agriculture, and security in the Niger Delta and regional cooperation.281
Some of these discussions have borne fruit as recent
U.S. assistance to the Independent National Electoral
Commission supported one of the fairest Nigerian
elections held yet, with work starting on the 2015 federal elections and on anti-corruption measures.282 In
the security realm, and indirectly in the others, the U.S.
military can assist in improving the situation in some
political economy endeavors by sharing operational
expertise and can continue to assist in professionalization of the Nigerian military. During austere times,
organizations like the Binational Commission, and
the partnership between U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Nigerian Ministry of Defense, must
leverage creative ideas to pursue mutual interests. In
operational matters, the U.S. military has experience
in internal stability operations in which Nigerians are
engaged and in related areas like peace operations,
fighting transnational crime, piracy suppression, and
counterterrorism. Having engaged in such operations
for some time, the Nigerian military will have some
things to teach Americans as well.
Internal stability operations and a 2009 amnesty
offer to insurgents in the Niger Delta region calmed
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Nigeria’s worst sectional violence in its oil rich region.
Disruptions to oil operations have decreased sharply,
and some regular economic activity has returned to
normal. Yet long-term solutions to the causes for the
unrest are mainly unaddressed, and the U.S. Government and military, with their recent experience in
stability operations, may help with this.283 U.S. Army
doctrine and experience includes the interrelated security, economic, political, infrastructure, justice, and
well-being aspects of stability operations that would
better inform the conduct of the Nigerian government
and military.
If such advice and cooperation is accepted, U.S.
experts from civil and military agencies could judiciously help the Nigerian government reinvigorate
its local, state, and federal capacity in implementing
its comprehensive political framework approach toward resolving the conflict in the Niger Delta.284 In
U.S. Army doctrine, such support is part of the security force assistance task in which U.S. forces support, develop, employ, and sustain host nation forces
and their legitimate government.285 However, current
U.S. spending and activities with Nigeria have not
directly improved stability operations. Since 2008,
the request for funds for the Stability Operations
subsector286 of the Peace and Security foreign assistance
category constituted about half of the total security aid
planned, but has consistently been unfunded.287 Nigerian military and police forces have not performed
well in their internal stability operations, so allowing
more U.S. interaction in needed elements of security
sector reform would be useful to create the space and
time needed for political and economic solutions like
President Jonathan’s waning initiative in the Niger
Delta. However, such interaction is also risky in the
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domestic politics of both countries, which is why this
type of funding and interaction is routinely curtailed.
A partial mitigation to the low stability operations
interaction with Nigerian forces is U.S. support for
peace operations training funded through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) account. U.S. forces engaged in peace operations support carry less political stigma for domestic audiences
in both countries, yet there remains much overlap in
the tactical skills, planning, command, training, interagency coordination, and operations found in stability operations activities. This type of training not only
supports important Nigerian peace deployments like
the U.S. trained battalions in the UN/Africa Union
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Mission in
Liberia (UNMIL), 288 but should also benefit domestic
stability indirectly if these peace operations skills are
later used by soldiers employed in the Niger Delta or
elsewhere in Nigeria. Training is conducted by the U.S.
Government through the Africa Contingencies Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program under
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) funds. Such
training is a major source of professionalization for
Nigerian forces, which have long had problems with
political intervention and human rights violations,
and thus is also important in stability operations.289 In
2011, there were 4,641 soldiers trained through GPOI
in 20 courses mostly conducted in Nigeria; in 2012,
another 7,043 were trained. Courses were conducted
in political-military relations, command and staff operations, prevention of gender based violence, and
soldiers’ basic peace support skills, among others.290
These activities certainly reinforce both countries’ interests by supporting regional stability, which is their
intent, and also support one of only four U.S. policy

59

objectives for Nigerian training assistance.291 This
training benefits stability inside Nigeria by continuing
to professionalize the Nigerian military and improve
its capacity to conduct necessary stability-like operations, so peace operations support should be offered
to the Nigerian government to the fullest extent that it
can gainfully be used.
The Nigerian government, with U.S. support, realizes that a comprehensive framework addressing the
concerns of the country’s parties is needed, particularly in economic development and human welfare services.292 Within the proposal of stability operations are
supporting solutions in the political economy; these
are covered under Peace and Security sector aid in the
subsector of Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation,
which is used to identify causes of conflict, respond to
those causes, and develop lasting solutions “no matter
what the cause of conflict might be.”293 This subsector
is usually the only one funded—averaging about $1
million per year, although receiving only $.5 million
in 2011, and typically only half of what is requested.294
This small amount with the equally small $.2 million
Infrastructure subsector funds in Economic Support
sector aid (the account that funds mainly agriculture
support) could be seed money to confront the physical and economic poverty that daunts the Niger Delta. Physical economic infrastructure is one striking
limitation to economic advancement because of weak
government capacity, noted throughout Nigeria, but
especially in the challenging geography of the Niger
Delta, which has been neglected by the government.295
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has much expertise in overseeing civilian infrastructure projects
in riparian environments that it could offer to assist a
comprehensive Nigerian transportation and develop-
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ment plan, especially if international oil giants operating in the region cooperate.296 Funding for this kind of
support could be supplemented by an energized Economic Support Fund, part of the U.S. Foreign Military
Assistance Program that promotes “economic and political stability in strategically important regions . . .
[for] infrastructure and development projects.”297 This
monograph has made the case for Nigeria to be a requisite “special security interest” through which development support should be attained. Infrastructure
development is one place where U.S. advice, skills,
and some funds can greatly leverage commercial and
government actions and build Nigeria’s capacity for
economic development while contributing to peace
and stability.
Another area where both sides may work together
to improve internal Nigerian security is in counterterrorism. As with many Nigerian problems, this also has
corruption, factionalism, degradation of well-being
and economic stagnation as fundamental causes.298
Unlike the stability operations approach taken by the
Nigerian government in the south, Nigeria has used
a counterterrorism strategy in the north, especially
against Boko Haram, but so far has only increased the
violence.299 The United States has not funded Nigeria’s
Counter-Terrorism subsector of the Peace and Security Assistance fund, despite regular funding requests
meant to improve Nigerian capability and institutionalize U.S. strategy.300 However, the United States
does give Nigeria additional security assistance funds
through the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program,
and has funded training through the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, to study regional terrorism issues and intelligence operations, as well as Sec-
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tion 1206, counterterrorism training and support—the
latter two usually at less than 5 percent of Nigeria’s
annual IMET funds.301 To ensure efficacy in sensitive
counterterrorism operations, the U.S. Government has
assisted in establishing a counterterrorism unit within
the Nigerian military, but support for a similar unit
for police forces continues to be barred by Congress.302
To augment current training, equipping, and organizing, U.S. assistance should also judiciously offer
planning, logistical, intelligence, and command and
control support to help the Nigerians better use their
assistance and hone their operations, reinforcing one
of the four U.S. policy objectives for Nigerian training
aid, enhancing counterterrorism capabilities.303
Several important caveats are needed, however,
for counterterrorism and other forms of U.S. security
assistance in line with the complications stated earlier.
First, direct U.S. intervention, and probably even overt
advisor field support, might be counterproductive in
the eyes of at least half of the population, the Muslims
in particular, and probably many more Nigerians.304
Second, U.S. counterterrorism support needs to build
Nigerian capacity to sustain its own operations and
must ensure it is tailored to Nigerian situations, not
those of other operations, even successful ones as have
been conducted between the United States and Philippine governments. Third, such operations must be
planned and conducted within the appropriate confines of Nigerian justice and security to both set the
proper example of good governance and to prevent
irritating the situation further as current operations
have done. In this regard, more advice and training
could be offered, especially in regards to police support, and tied to incentives to improve performance
along more effective counterterrorism methods to
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curb abuses and corruption within the system. How
much additional assistance the Nigerians may accept
remains open to question.
Other areas of cooperation in stability operations, anti-piracy, and transnational crime parallel the
causes and solutions outlined for counterterrorism,
but should emphasize the law enforcement aspect
even more. Transnational crime, trafficking in drugs
and humans, and financial fraud are each rampant
in Nigeria and debase civil society. However, illegal
firearms trafficking is especially threatening to internal security for a land as violent as Nigeria.305 Better policing and methods would help alleviate all of
these problems, and the U.S. Government can supply
expertise here.
U.S. military forces could help with improved international border control, through which much of
this trafficking is conducted across porous borders
that both supply Nigerians and serve as a waypoint to
more lucrative foreign markets.306 Typically only $.1-.2
million in the Transnational Crime subsector of Peace
and Security is given in aid to Nigeria, and none has
been planned since 2011, although training and technical assistance are this subsector’s goals.307 Instead,
the United States has directed millions to fight transnational crime in Nigeria through the International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
program. Here again, the United States should use
what leverage it gains from such assistance to help the
Nigerian government in its own efforts to modernize
and recruit less corruptible security forces, especially
in the police.308 INCLE also includes the mission of
elimination of nacro-terrorism, which complements
other potential areas of U.S.-Nigerian cooperation.309
Lessons gained from Iraq, Afghanistan, and U.S. bor-
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der operations should help inform the capabilities and
limits of military forces in these roles, and offer best
ways to supplement Nigerian police forces in better
performing their mission.
Piracy around Nigeria is another growing transnational crime. Incidents in the region have grown from
40 in 2008 to 64 in 2011, costing billions of dollars in
theft and lost government revenues, and impinging
on U.S. imports from a major supplier. This explains
why the U.S. training policy goal of “Build and enhance maritime security capacity to maintain territorial integrity and secure uncontrolled waters” is one
of four established for Nigeria.310 The biggest spurs for
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are the impunity of criminal gangs, ethnic militias from Nigeria, and low government capacity to combat it, all factors addressed
herein. The United States has supported Nigeria in this
fight with material aid, such as the four surplus U.S.
Coast Guard Balsam-class patrol ships given in 2003.
Training support comes through the Africa Partnership Station program, which trains Nigerians aboard
transiting U.S. ships in important skills like maritime
interdiction operations and counterterrorism.311 The
successes of these programs are a model for additional
U.S. aid to Nigeria.
First, they are focused on expertise that U.S. military forces have obtained through actual operations
elsewhere in the world and offered as part of regular security assistance. Second, training is conducted
directly between military forces where it is needed,
but avoids a long-term U.S. presence in country, and
it emphasizes an indirect approach of training, rather
than conducting operations. Third, transferred property, training, and exercise activities build interoperable capability, which shall be required should an
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international task force to combat piracy in the region
come to fruition, a UN initiative that the United States
quietly supports.312 The anti-piracy program is a mutually beneficial program that supports both sides’
expectations and part of the greater effort toward stability in Nigeria’s political economy.
To make U.S.-Nigerian military contacts more operationally effective and financially efficient, a DoDwide program to assign regionally aligned forces
oriented to Nigeria, or at least West Africa, under
AFRICOM integration should be improved to better implement security assistance and build regional
expertise under the direction of the DoS. Regionally
aligned forces entail specific units assigned in military-to-military partnerships that delve deeply into
local cultures and languages, geography, forces, and
challenges.313 U.S. units and individuals gain insight
and establish enduring personal relations through
training-focused visits in the equivalent of platoon- to
battalion-sized units.314
This approach makes sense if one believes there
will be no U.S. peer rival for a significant amount of
time, during which shaping activities dominate, and
U.S. units can engage in security force assistance and
support local stability operations.315 It also makes
sense if the DoD parcels high end threats like antiaccess/area denial to the Air Force and Navy, while
addressing low end threats “by building the military
capability of partner nations” through the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces as proposed
by former Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy.316 This partnering arrangement allows
units to augment training, equipping, and organizing
of Nigerian forces, especially in fields requiring understanding of local issues like logistics, intelligence,
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and command and control.317 For U.S. Army forces,
on whom the brunt of regional specialization would
fall, this alignment concept follows the vision imperative in the Army Chief of Staff’s 2012 Army Strategic
Planning Guidance: “Provide modernized and ready,
tailored land force capabilities to meet Combatant
Commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations.”318 The benefits of regionally aligned
forces include more effective interactions and support,
and improved U.S. understanding and interoperability during contingencies and multinational actions in
the future.
Elements of this regionally aligned force proposal
exist in the DoD, as Special Operations, Marine Corps,
and National Guard units are already aligned to Africa, with the Army adding its active duty conventional
forces as well. Special Forces units, whose focus is operating in the “human domain” of war, have long specialized in building their competence in the world’s
regions as advisors and operators to better complete
missions like foreign internal defense. The 3rd Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, NC, currently operates under Special Operations Command Africa. U.S.
Army civil affairs (CA) units are also specializing to
provide civil-military expertise to conventional forces
during theater engagement and full spectrum military
operations. Both the active duty 91st CA Battalion
(CAB) at Fort Bragg, and the Army Reserve 82nd CAB
at Fort Stewart, GA, (which offers more continuity and
unique civilian skills than the active 91st), also align
with AFRICOM.319 In 2007, the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group was commissioned to advise
U.S. units and partner nations on security training
and organization. Although originally meant to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, a special task
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force now rotates through Africa on security cooperation missions.320 Since 2006, the California National
Guard has partnered with the Nigerian military in a
long-term relationship in which the personnel stability inherent in Guard units is particularly effective at
achieving high levels of trust and understanding.321
The active duty Army is following the National Guard
in aligning “scalable, tailorable forces” to regions with
the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, Fort Riley, KS, slated
to provide “security cooperation and partnership
building missions in Africa”; this is the first region to
test this rotational model.322 These alignments, however, are all service component initiatives that should be
harnessed under DoD-wide oversight that specifically
seeks out other units and skills needed in the region.
Together, these dedicated units should offer useful
supplements “in what is essentially a domestic peacekeeping operation” in support of Nigerian stability.323
These alignment efforts could significantly augment customized support available to the Nigerian
government. However, such increase does come with
problems and challenges. The first is to get the Nigerian government to accept more of the needed type of
support offered by U.S. defense forces. Second, initial
and continuing education in the region and in specific
mission tasks are expensive and challenging with so
many people involved. Such training will probably
never meet the level needed, but would result in a
greater level of expertise than currently exists. The
investment in trained personnel and established relationships would have to be protected, too, requiring
changes in the personnel system to retain immersed
military members and minimize out-of-unit assignments—in essence creating a regimental system in the
regionally aligned active forces.324
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In addition to specializing people, unit equipment sets should also be tailored since the configuration that might work in the mountains of Ethiopia
or the temperate veldt of South Africa might not suit
the mission requirements for Nigeria.325 Functionallyspecialized units in the medical, police, and construction fields for example, would be in high demand,
meaning they probably could not regionally align but
would rely on the expertise of aligned units to shepherd their efforts. Such specialization of U.S. military
units works against the traditional flexibility sought
by standardizing unit skills and equipment which
makes them interchangeable across theaters in large
unit operations when contingencies so require.326 In
a major operation elsewhere requiring use of AFRICOM aligned units, all of this specialization will be for
naught, as equipment may be mismatched and necessary combined-arms maneuver skills not as strong as
their more used stability operations skills.327 Finally,
Africa is a huge region with remarkable diversity in
geography, climate, cultures, economies, history, and
politics. To have a unit regionally specialize in all of
Africa is an errand fraught with problems, i.e., high
priority subregions and crucial countries need to be
identified and units aligned there, rather than spread
thin (although one unit could focus on the noncritical
remainder). This monograph has made the case that
Nigeria should be one of the alignment focal points in
the world.
While this training, exercising, and indirect support is enhancing Nigerian technical capabilities, the
military-to-military contacts that are occurring at the
same time should also continue to professionalize the
Nigerian military and make it a more principled force
with better democratic civil-military relations and less
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corrupt and politicized members.328 This goal aligns
with the fourth U.S. training objective for Nigeria:
“Develop capacity of the military as a nonpolitical,
professional force respectful of human rights.”329 In
fact, the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission recognized that extralegal activity by the Nigerian security
forces leads to violence and recommended “cooperative efforts to improve Nigerian military and police
units.”330 At the tactical level, this means “better intelligence and prevention measures [that avoid a] heavyhanded response,” a problem which U.S. training and
interactions can address.331
At all levels, true respect for civil rights and rule
of law is also needed to build legitimacy for government efforts and prevent the spiral of retribution with
its citizens. Endemic corruption in the military, from
the petty in the ranks to the massive bunkering among
flag officers, and a historic propensity to overthrow
government administrations must also be curbed for
the military to exert a positive influence on activities in the political economy.332 Here, the example of
U.S. military personnel in close partnership over time
could influence the Nigerian military to move into a
more professional, apolitical stance. More directly,
IMET courses at the mid to senior officer level have
contributed to the professionalization of Nigerian
forces since security assistance was reopened to Nigeria in 2000, and the State Department’s Foreign Military Training Report attributes the Nigerian military
leadership’s proper conduct during recent elections to
this influence. 333 Corruption remains a huge problem
within the ranks, and although American military relationships and education may reduce this problem,
better pay and a change in political attitudes and cultural mores will be needed to fully professionalize the
Nigerian forces—changes that are out of reach of di69

rect U.S. military influence. Much needs to be done to
improve the civil-military relationship within Nigeria,
and U.S. efforts so far are helping, but here more funding for education and exchanges could go a long way.
Support to wide ranging stability operations in
Nigeria, including counterterrorism, suppression of
transnational crime and piracy, as well as related
peace operations, are limited, but are nonetheless useful contributions by the U.S. military and other agencies toward stabilizing and developing Nigeria. A
few opportunities to contribute directly to resolving
political and economic problems, like infrastructure
development and fighting piracy, are available but require funding and partnership at a level the U.S. and
Nigerian governments have so far been reluctant to
achieve. To get the most from what is available, these
and other cooperative actions that are acceptable to
both sides, within the restraints of a complicated relationship, are developed in the Nigerian government’s
Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plan. This
plan seeks to integrate the political, economic, social,
and military needs of its government. Elements of the
Nigerian IDAD may then be communicated through
the Binational Commission to be incorporated by
the U.S. Ambassador’s country team to harness the
considerable capability that already exists within the
U.S. Government in order to keep the process streamlined and limit manpower requirements. From this
plan, AFRICOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan
(TSCP) would coordinate the tasks and participation
appropriate for U.S. military agencies and units, especially leveraging the continuity of regionally aligned
forces.334 A comprehensive IDAD also benefits Nigeria
through the synergy that other countries and international institutions may contribute to achieve a cumulative result that no single contributor could afford,
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but from which all benefit through the stabilization
of Nigeria.335
CONCLUSION
Nigeria is an extraordinarily important country for
U.S. foreign relations in terms of bilateral economic
interests, great influence in Africa, and the many mutual interests both countries have maintained through
a generally good working relationship. The U.S. Government, therefore, has a particular interest in helping
Nigerians overcome the political economic problems
that severely divide it internally and threaten its very
integrity as a functioning state. That these problems
revolve around the divisive use of political, ethnic, religious, and regional groups—in which each tries to
improve its position in power and economic revenue
at the expense of the other—is why this monograph
identified political economic problems as the source
of much of Nigeria’s instability. Those sources, not the
more easily reported symptoms, must be directly addressed if there is to be a lasting positive impact on
the recurring crises in Nigeria. Nigeria’s chronically
poorly performing economy puts pressure on various
power groups to obtain their share of its rich public
natural resource revenues to benefit their leaders and
interest group supporters. Venal leadership and poor
government organization and laws often prevent addressing these problems effectively, although attempts
by administrations in the Fourth Republic to do better
are still being tested.
Nigerians have defined themselves through their
differences and not their similarities, which exacerbates the conflict over resources through violence and
calls for self-determination that weakens the state.
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In many ways, oil production in Nigeria has become
more a cause of serious problems than the means to
improving the economy and well-being of its people.
Nigeria has been poorly governed and is subject to
severe corruption that has left its polity divided with
fighting over power and revenues rather than enhancing the economy to benefit everyone, a classic
example of a rentier state under the “curse of oil.”
Sectarian and communal groups have been guided by
their leaders, often through traditional client-patron
relationships, to believe that such divisions are a sure
way to improving their situation, and this perspective has been ingrained into the national dialogue.
Although religious, ethnic, and regional differences
are often how dissension and violence are “instrumentalized” in Nigeria, they should not be confused
with the deeper causes of competition over power and
resources among a self-serving elite. Despite the best
of intentions, the law is contorted in this battle over
power through such principles as indigeneship, federal character, derivation, and zoning, which exposes
even further the shallowness of leadership in pursuit
of “the national cake.” Such differences are dangerous
to the stability and unity of Nigeria, since the country
contains traits found in other secession prone states,
and its people are easily divided along recognizable
fault lines with the motivation to secede.
Although an important state for U.S. international
interests, the United States is limited in what it can
do to help Nigeria address its core problems. The relationship is complicated by Nigeria’s insular nature;
the mutual dependence on oil trade, which limits actions in other fields; and, by the U.S. military’s lack
of appropriate expertise in the most important problem areas. Where there are areas of cooperation and
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influence, foreigner members must be sensitive to the
fact that Nigeria remains a fragile state, although few
Nigerians would have it disintegrate if avoidable. Foreigners must also confront the problem of weak and
corrupt leadership that characterizes Nigeria and its
relatively weak governing structures that are unable
to compensate for the weak leadership.
Within these limitations, the U.S. military must
play the hand it is dealt and can best do so through its
own strengths in sharing expertise with the Nigerian
military in the missions of stability operations, peace
operations, counterterrorism, and the suppression of
transnational crime and piracy. All of these can also
enhance the professionalization of the Nigerian military through regular contacts in exercises and training.
Professionalization works best through regular and
established contacts, and the alignment of U.S. forces
to the region is a trend in the right direction, but more
emphasis to get the most out of existing programs is
needed. All of this comes with caveats, complications,
and costs that are necessary to support a truly crucial
partner to American interests.
The recommendations herein recognize that most
uses of the U.S. or Nigerian military in addressing
the core political economy problems of the country
beyond basic security will probably to be indirect at
best, and may be an inefficient or inappropriate tool.336
Police, civilian government agencies, and international and nongovernmental organizations may provide
better support to accomplish the necessary tasks and
goals for Nigerian stability and progress. However,
until the other Nigerian and foreign organizations are
funded, focused on political economy solutions, and
enabled to plan and execute remedial actions, the current and proposed military options in this monograph,
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as caveated, are needed to leverage time and existing
efforts, and so should be continued where appropriate
and coordinated for both synergy and cost savings.
During the Binational Conference in 2009, Nigerian
Defense Minister Godwin Abbe indicated that cordial
standing relations would allow specific U.S. actions
to bring peace and security to the Niger Delta.337 A
strong security assistance program to Nigeria could
be part of a larger effort at political, economic, and social development designed to address the problems in
Nigeria and to help stabilize it, keep it whole, and lead
it toward its potential as an influential and prosperous
state—meeting both U.S. and Nigerian interests.
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